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ABSTRACT
This study investigated how focusing on the concrete details (experience focus)
versus broader life significance (coherence focus) of valenced transitions influences
appraisals of event impact, self-relevance, and present affect. Participants selected a past
event characterized by positive versus negative personal change and rated aspects of
emotion during recall (valence, intensity, and reference point). They described the event
using an experience or coherence focus and provided ratings on affect, impact, selfrelevance, and memory characteristics. Cognitive emotion regulation and preference for
abstraction were explored. A coherence (vs. experience) focus produced ratings of lower
negative affect and higher psychological impact and self-change for negative, but not
positive, events. The negative-coherence group shifted the most toward positive emotion.
Positive (vs. negative) events incited appraisals of greater positive affect, material impact,
centrality/importance, self-blame, and lower need for acceptance. A coherence focus is
thought to facilitate adaptive self-reflection via the reconciliation of personally salient
negative transitions.
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NOMENCLATURE
Mental focus: The two levels of mental construal emphasizing different elements of
personal experiences upon retrieval: the concrete details (experience focus) versus
broader life significance (coherence focus; Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
Experience focus: A focus on what it was like to experience an event directly as if one is
actually there again, noting specific sensorial and contextual details (e.g., the location,
specific actions, sights, sounds, smells, objects involved; Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
Coherence focus: A focus on the broader significance of an event, noting how it relates to
personal characteristics and other life events (e.g., previous experiences,
accomplishments, relationships, the future, one’s life as a whole and self as a person;
Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
Valence: In psychology, the quality of emotions, objects, or events characterizing their
attractiveness (positive valence) or aversiveness (negative valence;
http://psychologydictionary.org/).
Adaptive: In psychology, the ability to adjust and function well in response to changes in
cognitions, emotions, and/or social environment. Such responses are productive for the
individual and are associated with psychological health
(http://psychologydictionary.org/).
Maladaptive: In psychology, the inability to adjust and function well in response to
changes in cognitions, emotions, and/or social environment. Such responses are
counterproductive to the individual and are associated with psychological dysfunction
(http://psychologydictionary.org/).
Reference point for evoked emotion: The relative source of current emotion during recall
of a past event: emotional reactions may derive mostly from thinking about what it was
like to experience the event directly (experience referent) or from thinking about the
broader consequences of the event to oneself and one’s life (consequences referent; Libby
& Eibach, 2011b).

xii

INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that memory is a partially reconstructive rather than
wholly reproductive affair (Bartlett, 1932). Mental representations of personal past
events, or autobiographical memories, are not static in the minds of those who
experience them; rather, they are frequently composed of elements drawn from various
sources, episodes, and prior general knowledge, often without conscious awareness. The
meaning attributed to personal events is also not fixed. Each time one calls to mind a past
experience, even those considered to be self-defining, there is opportunity for the
development of new meaning. For instance, appraisals of the impact and self-relevance of
past transitional events - events that produce marked change in the way people perceive
themselves, live their lives, and understand the world (Brown & Lee, 2010) - can be
actively manipulated at the time of retrieval (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015).
Autobiographical memories can also arouse emotions in the present, emotions
similar in type and intensity to the original experience (Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer,
1981). For example, recalling the death of a loved one may re-invoke feelings of sadness,
whereas recalling a major achievement may conjure feelings of exhilaration and pride.
Furthermore, some aspects of the event, upon reflection, may be more emotionally
evocative than others. For instance, emotions may primarily derive from thinking about
what it was like to experience the event directly (e.g., recalling the specific thoughts,
feelings, location, and surroundings when becoming aware of a loved one’s death), or
from thinking about the broader consequences of the event (e.g., how the loss of this
significant other has altered notions of oneself as a person, how it relates to other life
events, and how it informs the future; Libby & Eibach, 2011b). However, irrespective of
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this reference point for evoked emotion (I will return to this idea in subsequent sections),
the ability to regulate memory-induced emotions is intricately tied to the construction of
meaning (Cox & McAdams, 2014; Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Perhaps then, the ways in
which people go about reflecting upon prior episodes can also influence present affect at
the time of retrieval.
Indeed, research from personality, developmental, social, and cognitive
psychology converges on the idea that the strategies people use to (re)construct their
personal pasts can inform current psychological functioning (e.g., Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000; McAdams, 2001). For instance, certain cognitive strategies have been
shown to influence present well-being for better (Zhou, Sedikides, Wildschut, & Gao,
2008) or worse (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999), judgments about the self and others,
decisions about future goals (Libby & Eibach, 2011b), appraisals of the significance of
past events to one’s identity and life-story (McAdams, 2001), judgments of closure
(Crawley, 2010), and perceptions of how one responds to emotions once they emerge
(Cox & McAdams, 2014).
In subsequent sections, I introduce two distinct cognitive strategies for
autobiographical event representation, namely mental focus and imagery perspective,
discuss how they relate to each other and to other conceptually similar constructs
reported in the literature along with how they may inform facets of self-knowledge. I then
review discrepancies in the literature concerning motives underlying these strategies, in
addition to disagreements regarding their implications for emotion and meaning making.
Designed to elucidate these discrepancies, the proposed study investigates whether and
how focusing on the concrete details (experience focus) versus broader life significance
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(coherence focus) of emotionally valenced transitional events can inform individuals’
present affect and attributions of event impact and self-relevance.
Cognitive Strategies for Representing Autobiographical Events
Mental focus. One factor known to influence the attribution of meaning to events
is the mental focus people use when thinking about them (Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
An experience focus entails retrieving and describing what it is like to experience an
event directly as if one is actually there, noting specific sensorial and contextual elements
(e.g., where the event took place, who was involved, what actions were performed, and
what was seen, heard, and smelled). Conversely, a coherence focus involves retrieving
and describing the implications of an event within the context of one’s life as a whole,
remarking on how it relates to personal characteristics and other life events (e.g., how the
event relates to previous accomplishments, relationships, and the future; McAdams,
2001; Pillemer, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985).
Though people spend relatively little time intentionally reflecting on themselves
and other non-immediate events in the course of daily living (Csikszentmihalyi &
Figurski, 1982), research suggests the inclination to take such a perspective can lead to
beneficial outcomes. For instance, Vallacher and Wegner (1989) found that individuals
who were more inclined to construe actions abstractly tended to be less impulsive, had
stronger internal loci of control, and were more certain of their self-concepts. Further,
Cox and McAdams (2014) provide evidence that deriving positive abstract meaning from
highly valenced, identity-rich memories (i.e., high and low point life episodes) can
promote adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies.
Imagery perspective. Another cognitive strategy for autobiographical event
3

representation concerns the perspective used to envision events. People may visualize an
event using a first-person perspective in which they mentally “see” the event as if from
their own eyes, or they may visualize the event using a third-person perspective, in which
they adopt the vantage point of an observer to envision themselves as well as their
surroundings (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Comment on this phenomenon originates early in
psychology’s history (e.g., Freud, 1907/1960; Galton, 1883; Henri & Henri, 1897).
Since this time, research has shown that, without explicit prompts to adopt a
particular perspective, individuals may experience images from each vantage point
during recall (Huebner & Frederickson, 1999), and for positive and negative memories,
they generally report greater first-person imagery (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der
Linden, 2003). Moreover, memories recalled from an observer’s (third-person) visual
perspective tend to be associated with less emotional arousal compared to those recalled
from a field (first-person) perspective (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson &
Swanson, 1993; Sutin & Robins, 2008). Examining the effects of a similar psychological
mechanism termed self-distancing, which encompasses slightly more than visual imagery
alone, Ayduk and Kross (2010) found that adaptive reconciliation of negative past events
(via reductions in distress and rumination) resulted from a more distanced (third-person),
as compared to immersed (first-person) view of the self and one’s recalled experience
(however, see Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011; Marigold, Eibach, Libby, Holmes,
& Ross, 2011, for evidence to the contrary).
Expanding our understanding of the use of various cognitive strategies, therefore,
has the potential to further inform adaptive human functioning in terms of healthy
meaning making and regulation of memory-induced emotions. I begin with an essential
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component of autobiographical remembering (Conway, 2005; Wilson & Ross, 2003), one
through which these cognitive strategies are proposed to operate: the self.
Mental Focus, Imagery Perspective, and the Self
Libby and Eibach (2011a) suggest the two levels of mental focus outlined above
are intricately related to the two facets of the self proposed by William James’
(1890/1950): the “I”, or experiential self (self as subject of thought) - the experience of
the self as engaging with immediate surroundings (Legrand & Ruby, 2009), and the
“me”, or conceptual self (self as object of thought) - a general self-awareness that
includes theories of personality, values, life themes, and goals (Conway, 2005;
McAdams, 2001). Essentially then, focusing on the concrete details of events, an
experience focus, forms the basis for the experiential self, whereas focusing on events in
terms of their broader life significance, a coherence focus, forms the basis for the
conceptual self (Libby & Eibach, 2011a).
Imagery perspective is thought to serve a similar role in self-construction through
its close relationship with mental focus. Libby and Eibach (2009, 2011b) suggest that
shifts in imagery perspective correspond to an understanding of events from the bottomup, in terms of the phenomenology evoked by concrete features of the pictured event
(first-person), or from the top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate the pictured
event within a broader context (third-person). More abstract cognitive strategies (i.e.,
third-person imagery, coherence focus) are therefore thought to function in adaptive selfreflection by providing the cognitive means with which to integrate events within a
generalized framework of personal themes, thereby informing notions of how the self
evolves across time (Conway, 2005; McAdams, 2001).
5

One’s currently operating self-theory can also inform the mental focus and
imagery perspective used at retrieval. For instance, Libby and Eibach (2011a) found that
a theory of oneself as having changed versus remaining stable over time predicted
imagery perspective irrespective of event valence: self-stability was associated with firstperson imagery whereas self-change was associated with third-person imagery. Further,
individuals’ self-reports of focusing more on analyzing the event (coherence focus),
compared to experiencing it (experience focus), accounted for changed individuals’
greater use of third-person imagery.
Libby and Eibach (2011a) take this as support for the view that third-person
imagery is determined by a motive to achieve a coherent self-understanding across time
(self-coherence motive; McAdams, 1997; Vinitzky-Seroussi, 1998) rather than a motive
to disown events that reflect poorly on the present self (self-enhancement motive; Leary,
2007; Sanitioso, 2008; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Therefore, when all else is equal,
people should use third-person imagery when recalling an event that is inconsistent (vs.
consistent) with their present self-concept, and this effect should not depend on whether
participants perceive change for the better or change for the worse, but rather on whether
they focus on the event’s broader significance (third-person) or on its concrete features
(first-person). The relationship between imagery perspective and mental focus (thirdperson/coherence; first-person/experience) appears to be bidirectional; that is,
manipulations of third-person imagery tend to exaggerate default assumptions of selfchange by way of inducing a more reflective (i.e., coherence) focus (Libby, Eibach, &
Gilovich, 2005). This research aptly lends itself to an examination of mental focus effects
per se on other self-relevant phenomena, such as appraisals of personal meaning.
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Mental Focus and Attributions of the Impact and Self-Relevance of Events
The current study centers on forms of meaning that include perceptions of the
material and psychological changes resulting from an event (transitional impact), along
with how central the event is perceived to be to one’s identity and life-story (selfrelevance). Although it has been suggested that self-defining memories, affording greater
emotional arousal, are tagged with particular fixed meaning that is stored with the
memory (Beike & Crone, 2012), Boucher and Scoboria (2015) provide divergent
evidence. They found that the perceived impact and self-relevance of self-selected life
transitions were indeed malleable depending on the mental focus (coherence vs.
experience) incited during retrieval. Regardless of the emotional valence associated with
events, those who employed a coherence focus appraised their event as being more
impactful, more strongly connected to other life events, and more central to their identity.
Interestingly, mental focus was found to influence appraisals of both psychological
impact (change in attitudes, thoughts, emotions, sense of self, and moral understanding)
and, to a lesser extent, material impact (change in places frequented, things owned,
people associated with, and daily activities). Thus, even ostensibly “fixed” (material)
aspects of key past experiences are subject to variation depending on how retrieval
occurs.
Notably, whereas previous research suggests people reconcile perceptions of selfchange by spontaneously adopting a broader reflective mindset in search of turning points
to explain discrepancies (McAdams, Josselson, & Leiblich, 2001; Ross & McFarland,
1988), this study illustrates how the reverse also holds true: when thinking about events
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characterized by change, adopting a coherence focus coincides with a stronger sense of
change in self-concept and aspects of daily life.
Just as life transitions bisect relatively stable lifetime periods (Brown, Hansen,
Lee, Vanderveen, & Conrad, 2012), and may serve as anchors for discriminating selves
of different time periods, so too can negative/low-point and positive/high-point episodes.
Such experiences are transitional in that they distinguish lifetime periods of reduced selfrelevance and can be framed as part of a positive trajectory (change for the better) or
negative trajectory (change for the worse) in one’s life-story. Taken together, the
preceding research suggests that mental focus should exert effects on perceived impact
and self-relevance irrespective of event valence.
Imagery Perspective and Emotion
Whereas Boucher and Scoboria (2015) demonstrated mental focus effects on
perceived impact and self-relevance for self-selected past transitions, there exists no
research to date examining the influence of mental focus on present affect for explicitly
valenced events. Imagery perspective, and variants thereof, have however been
considered in relation to negative emotions (e.g., Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk,
2012; Kross & Ayduk, 2010). Hypotheses concerning the effects of mental focus on
present affect must therefore be gleaned via mental focus’ close relationship with
imagery perspective; that is, in light of evidence supporting the hypothesis that
perspective functions to inform the level of meaning of events (Libby & Eibach, 2011b).
There are discrepancies in the literature concerning the effects of self-reflection
on emotion, which Kross and Ayduk (2011) fittingly refer to as the “self-reflection
paradox.” On the one hand, reflecting on negative emotions can lead to important
8

physical and mental health benefits (e.g., Pennebaker, 1997; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008).
However, efforts to understand negative emotions can also incite ruminative thinking,
which can make people feel worse (e.g., Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, Smith, & Harvey,
2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Literature concerning
relationships amongst mental focus, imagery perspective, and default assumptions about
how recalled events relate to the self (i.e., currently operating self-theories; Libby &
Eibach, 2011b) may therefore prove integral to elucidating the effects of concrete versus
abstract event construals on present emotion, and explaining why people’s attempts to
make sense of negative feelings sometimes succeed and other times fail.
It has been suggested that third-person imagery functions to reduce envisioned
events’ power to elicit emotion via psychological self-distancing (e.g., Holmes &
Mathews, 2010; Kenny et al., 2009); that is, by adopting a self-distanced (third-person)
perspective rather than a self-immersed (first-person) perspective, the self that reasons
about a past event becomes psychologically removed from the self that has experienced
it. It is this “separation of self” (likened to Libby & Eibach’s [2011a] notion of selfinconsistency) that allows one to reflect on the meaning (why) rather than the process
(how) of that event, thereby diminishing associated emotion (Kross & Ayduk, 2011;
Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). Indeed, Ayduk and Kross (2010)
found that using a self-distanced perspective to reflect on negative events reduced
feelings of emotional distress, whereas adopting a self-immersed perspective had the
reverse effect. Noteworthy, this model regards the self as it relates to recollected concrete
experience. Thus, separation from self necessarily refers to separation from the Jamesian
“I” (James, 1890/1950).
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According to the alternative view, the self is dual-faceted, and the function of
imagery perspective is determined not only by the separation of experiential self, but also
by the integration of the conceptual self (Libby & Eibach, 2011b); that is, rather than
causing people to adopt a detached, objective interpretation of an event, third-person
imagery causes people to integrate it within a broader framework of general self-views,
and their emotional reactions reflect the subjective meaning that results (e.g., Libby et al.,
2011). As previously mentioned, thoughts about what it was like to experience an event
versus its broader life consequences may be used to define the event’s emotional
significance (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), and this
reference point for evoked emotion is thought to moderate the effect of imagery
perspective on emotion (Libby & Eibach, 2011b). For instance, if emotions primarily
derive from thinking about the broader consequences of an event within one’s life, then
third-person imagery (and by extension, a coherence focus) should magnify whatever
emotion is associated with his or her currently operating self-theory (e.g., change for the
better/positive emotion vs. change for the worse/negative emotion). Adhering to this
logic, picturing a past failure from the third-person, as opposed to the first-person,
perspective was found to significantly increase feelings of shame for people with low
self-esteem (event and associated emotion agrees with the self-theory), while
significantly decreasing shame among people with high self-esteem (event and associated
emotion disagrees with the self-theory; Libby et al., 2011).
It should follow then, that in order for a coherence focus to promote adaptive
coping, an adaptive framework must also be specified (e.g., a theory of self-change vs.
self-stability; positive change vs. negative change; concrete vs. abstract emotional
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referent) to guide the meaning making and emotional reaction that occurs. These “default
assumptions” or “self-theories” serve to explain the effects of self-distancing on the
adaptive reconciliation of negatively charged events (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross
& Ayduk, 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). In these studies, people were asked to
“envision the distant you,” implying that the present self is somehow distinct from the
past self in memory. The assumed self-theory then is, “this event does not reflect who I
am” (self-change), and therefore third-person imagery serves to reduce associated
negative emotion (distress). According to Libby and Eibach’s (2011b) model, without
this self-distancing instruction, people might consider the negative past self as part of the
present, in which case third-person imagery could produce damaging effects on present
well-being (e.g., Libby et al., 2011; Libby, Schaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007).
Notably, previous research concerning cognitive strategies and emotion focuses
almost exclusively on negative emotions associated with significant negative events (e.g.,
Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009); for example, events
characterized by “overwhelming sadness” (Kross et al., 2012, p. 562), “overwhelming
anger and hostility” (Kross et al., 2005, p. 711), or “distress” (Schartau et al., 2009, p.
23). Certainly however, people’s autobiographical histories are composed of more than
solely negative experiences necessitating emotion regulation in the present. And, akin to
the subtle but important difference between experiential self-separation and conceptual
self-integration, the attenuation of negative emotions can be distinguished from the
preservation of positive emotions. Moreover, events deemed personally important appear
to be granted preferential encoding and maintenance within autobiographical memory
(Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Pillemer, 1998; Robinson, 1992; Singer & Salovey, 1993)
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making them equitably suited to both experience and coherence manipulations. Libby and
Eibach’s (2011b) model, then, provides a suitable platform from which to examine
mental focus effects on significant positive and negative events characterized by personal
change (improvement vs. decline); a compromise amongst various lines of research
investigating self-distancing (Kross & Ayduk, 2011), imagery perspective (Libby &
Eibach, 2011a), and mental focus (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015).
Just as life episodes and theories of self-change can be highly valenced, so too can
emotion regulation efforts. Cox and McAdams (2014) found that positive meaning
making of both high and low-point life episodes predicted positive emotion regulation
strategies (refocusing, reappraisal, and putting into perspective), whereas negative
meaning making of low-point life episodes predicted negative emotion regulation
strategies (self-blame and rumination). Participants in this study were prompted to
discuss the details of their events and then reflect on the broader implications, which can
be likened to a shift in mental focus from experience to coherence. It is therefore
unknown whether this mental focus shift, or a coherence focus alone, can account for the
findings. In any case, Cox and McAdams (2014) further clarify the “self-reflection
paradox” in suggesting that the form of event appraisal matters for adaptive versus
maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation.
Taken together, the effects of mental focus on emotion for positive versus
negative transitions should depend on whether the direction of understanding
characterizing each focus (experience [bottom-up] vs. coherence [top-down]) agrees with
one’s currently operating self-theory, namely, the reference point for evoked emotion
(experience of the event [bottom-up] vs. its consequences [top-down]), in which case a
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coherence focus should magnify emotions associated with the event. To use negative
transitions as an example, if current emotions primarily result from thinking about the
broader consequences of the event in one’s life, then a coherence focus should produce
reports of greater associated (i.e., negative) affect, relative to an experience focus.
Conversely, if emotions mainly derive from thinking about what it was like to experience
the event, then a coherence focus should reveal lower associated (i.e., negative) affect,
compared to an experience focus. Finally, the effects of a coherence focus on emotion
regulation should depend on whether the meaning making that takes place is positive or
negative.
Overview of the Present Study
Purpose. This study investigated whether and how instructing people to focus on
the concrete details (experience focus) versus broader life-significance (coherence focus)
of a self-selected negative versus positive transitional event influences present affect and
perceptions of event impact and self-relevance. Ancillary aims were to explore adaptive
and maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies, preferences for abstraction, and
select phenomenological aspects of remembering.
Implications. By controlling event valence and accounting for a proposed
moderating variable (i.e., reference point for evoked emotion), this study is positioned to
address discrepancies in the literature concerning motives to abstract (self-enhancement
vs. self-coherence) and the outcomes of abstraction (adaptive vs. maladaptive). It also
serves to extend previous findings concerning the effects of mental focus on appraisals of
transitional events (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015) in the realm of controlled memoryinvoked emotions. Doing so addresses the potential malleability of meaning attributions
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and emotional reactions for significant valenced autobiographical events (e.g., Beike &
Crone [2012] argue that self-defining events are fixed in their meaning, save for when
emotional response is sufficiently low), which is particularly important given such
appraisals can inform goal pursuit (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) and
psychopathology (Sarp & Tosun, 2011).
In a clinical realm, this study speaks to how conceptually similar ‘self-distancing’
strategies, for example, in therapies for depression (Beck, 1970), borderline personality
disorder (Linehan, 1993), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Resick et al., 2008),
independently contribute to the alleviation or exacerbation of distress. Though the
benefits of self-distancing have been demonstrated in populations with clinical depression
(Kross & Ayduk, 2010) and bipolar disorder (Gruber, Harvey, & Johnson, 2009), as I
have reviewed, a distanced vantage point may not always serve to blunt emotional
response (e.g., Marigold et al., 2011). Adhering to Libby and Eibach’s (2011b) model
concerning third-person imagery, the effects of a coherence focus on adaptive versus
maladaptive coping should depend on one’s currently operating self-theory in relation to
the event being recalled. Therefore, if the event represents a positive turning point, a
coherence focus should signal recovery. However, if the event represents a negative or
even traumatic turning point, as in the case of PTSD (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007), a
coherence focus could be detrimental.
In sum, this study is designed to provide insight into the ways in which mental
foci may differentially inform present affect, attributions of event impact and selfrelevance, along with cognitive emotion regulation strategies following the retrieval of
significant positive versus negative transitional events. In so doing, it stands to resolve
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theoretical and empirical discrepancies in the literature, elucidate the mechanisms by
which mental focus promotes adaptive self-reflection, and suggest important factors to
consider in clinical research and practice.
Hypotheses
Refer to Table 1 for a list of all predictions and associated variables.
Hypothesis 1: Transitional impact and self-relevance. In line with previous
research (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015), irrespective of event valence, a coherence focus
was expected to reveal higher ratings of perceived impact (material and psychological)
and self-relevance (centrality of the event to identity and life-story, importance,
connectedness to other life events, and personality change), relative to an experience
focus (H1a). Mental focus was also hypothesized to exert greater effects on appraisals of
psychological impact relative to material impact (H1b). Finally, in so far as individuals
seek to maintain a consistent and positive view of self (McAdams, 1997; Sanitioso,
2008), positive events were predicted to be appraised as more important and central to
one’s identity and life story, compared to negative events (H1c).
Hypothesis 2: Present affect. After controlling for pre-manipulation state affect,
individuals’ self-identified reference point for evoked emotion was expected to moderate
the effect of mental focus on post-manipulation state affect for events that agreed in
valence. That is, (H2a) if emotional response was primarily derived from thinking about
the broader consequences of the event, then a coherence focus was expected to reveal
ratings of greater associated emotion, relative to an experience focus (i.e., if a positive
event was recalled, positive affect would be higher; if a negative event was recalled,
negative affect would be higher). Conversely, (H2b) if emotions mostly stemmed from
15

Table 1
Hypothesized Effects of Mental Focus on Perceived Impact, Self-Relevance, State Affect,
and Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies for Valenced Transitional Events
Independent
Variables
Mental focus:
Coherence
Experience
Transitional
valence:
Positive
Negative

Dependent
Variables
Impact:
Transitional
Impact Scale
(TIS-12)
Self-relevance:
Centrality of
Event Scale
(CES)
Personality
change
Importance
Connectedness
State affect:
Positive and
Negative Affect
Schedule
(PANAS)

Cognitive
Emotion
Regulation
Questionnaire
(CERQ)
Imagery
perspective

Hypotheses
Irrespective of event valence, a coherence
(vs. experience) focus should reveal higher
ratings of perceived impact and selfrelevance.
Mental focus is expected to exert greater
effects for psychological impact relative to
material impact.
Positive (vs. negative) events should be
appraised as more important and central to
identity and life story.
Reference point for evoked emotion should
moderate the effect of mental focus on
present affect for events that agree in
valence:
If emotions are primarily derived from
thinking about the broader consequences of
the event, then a coherence (vs. experience)
focus should reveal higher ratings of
associated emotion.
If emotions are primarily derived from
thinking about what it was like to
experience the event, then a coherence (vs.
experience) focus should reveal ratings of
lower associated emotion.
Personality change valence may moderate
the effect of mental focus on positive versus
negative emotion regulation strategies.

If event valence predicts imagery
perspective, this would offer support for the
self-enhancement motive (Sanitioso, 2008).
If self-change predicts imagery perspective,
this would lend support for the selfcoherence motive (McAdams, 1997).

Memory
characteristics

Moderators/
Controls

Self-distancing and imagery perspective are
expected to positively correlate.
Mental focus is expected to produce small
effects on perceptual strength and feeling of
reliving, with a coherence focus producing
lower ratings than an experience focus.
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(Moderator)
Reference point for
evoked emotion:
Experience vs.
consequences
(adapted from
Libby & Eibach,
2011b)
(Control) Premanipulation state
affect:
Self-Assessment
Mannequin
(SAM)
(Moderator)
Personality Change
Valence (Libby &
Eibach, 2011a)

thinking about what it was like to experience the event directly, then a coherence focus
was hypothesized to reveal ratings of lower associated emotion, compared to an
experience focus (i.e., if a positive event was recalled, positive affect would be lower; if a
negative event was recalled, negative affect would be lower). Due to the fact positive
affect and negative affect are theorized to be orthogonal constructs (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegan, 1988), and given previous research does not address potential mental focus
effects on emotions that run counter to event valence, predictions to these effects were
not formulated.
Taken together, hypotheses 1 and 2 support the view that contextualized meaning
and present affect do not comprise opposite ends of a single continuum (i.e., a rise in one
does not necessarily indicate decline in the other). The self-reflection paradox provides
evidence of this (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
Hypothesis 3: Cognitive emotion regulation strategies. Due to the lack of
literature that would enable confident predictions concerning the effects of mental focus
on cognitive emotion regulation strategies, the inclusion of this variable was exploratory.
However, given Cox and McAdams’ (2014) findings that valenced meaning making
predicted valenced cognitive emotion regulation strategies, then, (H3) to the extent a
coherence focus encompasses more positive meaning relative to an experience focus (as
indicated through reports of greater change for the better), a coherence focus was
expected to reveal more positive (i.e., adaptive), and less negative (i.e., maladaptive)
cognitive emotion regulation strategies. In other words, perceived personality change
valence was considered as a possible moderator for mental focus effects on these
regulation strategies.
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Ancillary hypotheses. Given prior work involving mental focus and imagery
perspective (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; Libby & Eibach, 2011a), mental focus was
expected to operate likewise to imagery perspective (coherence/third-person;
experience/first-person) but not necessarily in accordance with it. This is because,
whereas Libby and Eibach (2011a) manipulated self-change for temporally controlled
events, in the current study (as with Boucher & Scoboria, 2015), the events could be
drawn from any point in one’s past and were themselves characterized by change - a
variable implicated as a determinant of third-person imagery. Still, (H4a) if event valence
predicts imagery perspective irrespective of mental focus, it would offer support for the
self-enhancement motive (Sanitioso, 2008). Alternatively, (H4b) if personality change
predicts imagery perspective irrespective of mental focus, this would accord with the
self-coherence motive (McAdams, 1997). In any case, (H4c) imagery perspective and
self-distance ratings were expected to correlate (third-person/self-distanced vs. firstperson/self-immersed). Finally, (H4d) in agreement with prior work (Boucher &
Scoboria, 2015), mental focus was expected to produce small effects on aspects of
recollection including perceptual strength and feeling of reliving, with a coherence focus
producing lower ratings than an experience focus.
METHODOLOGY
Participants
A total of 209 participants (77.5% female; 71.8% White/European; Mage = 21.30;
SD = 5.14, range 17 to 52) were recruited through the University of Windsor’s
psychology participant pool and received academic credit. For sufficient analytical
power, groups were intended to consist of 60 participants (N = 240) based on G*Power
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calculations (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), using d = 0.50 (Boucher &
Scoboria, 2015), α = .05, Power = 0.85, two potential covariates, and considerations of
dropout, incomplete participation, and/or invalid responding. Inclusion criteria consisted
of English as a first language, the willingness to report on a significant past event in a
research context, and no prior exposure to the manipulation via earlier studies.
Materials and Measures
Emotional valence, intensity, and reference point. After selecting a transitional
event, participants rated the valence, intensity, and reference point for their emotions
using Likert scales. The valence item read, “The emotions I have when I recall the
episode are,” -3 (extremely negative) to 3 (extremely positive; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010;
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). The intensity item read, “As I am thinking about this event
now, my feelings are,” 1 (not intense) to 7 (very intense; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, &
Raye, 1988). These items were also administered post-mental focus manipulation, thus
affording an examination of emotion valence and intensity shifting across time points. A
modified 8-point mental focus rating scale (adapted from Libby & Eibach, 2011a) was
used to derive individuals’ reference points for evoked emotion (i.e., whether emotions
primarily derived from thinking about what it was like to experience the event versus its
broader consequences; see Appendix B). Introducing these items at a time point
(approximately 2 weeks) prior to the mental focus manipulation was meant to limit any
potential priming effects (see, Shaeffer, Libby, & Eibach, 2011), offering protection
against threats to internal validity; that is, the possibility that exposure to the emotional
referent item confounds mental focus effects becomes reduced if introduced at an early
enough time point.
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State affect, pre-manipulation. The Self-Assessment Mannequin (SAM; Bradley
& Lang, 1994), an easy to administer, non-verbal method for quickly assessing emotional
valence and arousal, was used to provide an indication of baseline state affect, which was
controlled in the analyses (consistent with Kross et al., 2012). The valence subscale, for
instance, presents participants with a series of five faces that range in their expression
from extreme frown to a broad smile (see Appendix C). This measure has demonstrated
good convergent validity with other measures of affect (e.g., r = .97, for the Semantic
Differential Scale; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). In the current study, weak-to-moderate
correlations were found for SAM (pleasure and arousal composite) and PANAS ratings:
Positive Affect, r(208) = 0.39 [0.24, 0.51], and Negative Affect, r(208) = -0.26 [-0.40, 0.12].
State affect, post-manipulation. State affect following the mental focus
manipulation was assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson et al., 1988; see Appendix E). The PANAS prompts participants to rate of the
extent to which they feel certain emotions, such as “upset” and “proud,” on a scale
ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The two 10-item PANAS
subscales have demonstrated adequate internal consistency (α ranged from .86 to .90 for
PA, and .84 to .87 for NA), quasi-independence (r ranged from -0.12 to -0.23), and
stability (8-week test-retest r for the General time frame was .68 for PA and .71 for NA;
Watson et al., 1988). Current alphas were .87 for Negative Affect and .89 for Positive
Affect.
Transitional impact. Transitional impact was assessed using the 12-item
Transitional Impact Scale (TIS-12; Svob, Brown, Reddon, Uzer, & Lee, 2013; see
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Appendix F). The TIS-12 identifies changed and stable aspects of a person’s life
following an event and provides an index of overall impact. It consists of two 6-item
subscales: Material Impact (degree of perceived change in the concrete context of daily
living) and Psychological Impact (degree of perceived change in thoughts, attitudes,
emotions, identity, etc.). Items are rated on 5-point scales ranging from completely
disagree to completely agree. The measure has demonstrated good internal consistency
(full scale α = .83; Material α = .79, Psychological α = .76; Svob et al., 2013). Current
alphas were .83 for the full scale, .83 for Material Impact, and .78 for Psychological
Impact.
Self-relevance. Due to the fact the self-relevance of events is a broad notion with
no currently agreed-upon framework for measurement, this study included a number of
concepts: the centrality of the event to identity and life-story, the personal importance of
the event, the connectedness of the event to other events, and degree of perceived
personality change as a result of the event. To assess centrality, the Centrality of Event
Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; see Appendix G) was used, with items anchored 1
(totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) and consisting of, for instance, “I feel that event has
become part of my identity.” The 7-item CES scale has demonstrated good reliability (α
= .88; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; α = .88 in the current sample). One item assessing life
importance was drawn from Berntsen and Bohn (2010), one item pertaining to event
connectedness was derived from Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003), and an item
assessing personality stability vs. change was adapted from Libby and Eibach (2011a).
Intercorrelations between the four variables indicated weak-to-moderate shared variance
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(r ranged from .24 to .66). Due to their relative independence, each variable was
examined separately in the main analyses.
Cognitive emotion regulation strategies. The Cognitive Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001) is a 36-item scale
measuring nine cognitive coping strategies individuals use after a difficult life
experience. Four of the subscales constitute ‘less adaptive’ coping strategies (self-blame,
other-blame, rumination, and catastrophizing), and five subscales comprise ‘more
adaptive’ coping strategies (positive refocusing, planning, positive reappraisal, putting
into perspective, and acceptance). Each item pertains to a single subscale with responses
ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Garnefski et al. (2001) reported good
internal consistency for the Positive (more adaptive) subscale (α ranged from .89 to .91),
Negative (less adaptive) subscale (α ranged from .82 to .87), and overall scale (α ranged
from .92 to .93), along with adequate-to-good test-retest reliability after 5 months (r
ranged from .62 to .64; see Appendix H). In the current sample, alphas were .88, .81, and
.81 for the positive subscale, negative subscale, and full scale, respectively.
Items included for secondary analyses. Items associated with the
phenomenological experience of remembering were used in order to situate the findings
in relation to previous research using these items (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015), and in
relation to other autobiographical memory research in which these items are widely used
(e.g., Scoboria et al., 2014; see Appendix I). The imagery perspective item, derived from
Libby and Eibach (2011a), asks individuals to indicate the relative proportion of images
experienced from each perspective using an 8-point scale ranging from entirely firstperson to entirely third-person. A similarly anchored item assessing the extent of
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experiential self-immersion versus self-distancing, derived from Ayduk and Kross
(2010), was included to examine its relation to imagery perspective and mental focus.
Additional items (drawn from Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Johnson et al., 1988;
Rubin et al., 2003) employed 7-point rating scales that differed in their anchors. These
items consisted of emotional valence, emotional intensity, vividness of imagery, strength
of perceptual characteristics, feeling of reliving, feeling of re-experiencing, bodily
reaction, clarity of location, clarity of objects involved, clarity of people involved,
narrative coherence, and frequency thought/talked about. Items assessing subjective
temporal distance (derived from Libby & Eibach, 2011a) and objective temporal distance
(derived from Berntsen & Bohn, 2010) were included based on prior research suggesting
that positive events are reported to feel more recent relative to negative events (Temporal
Self-Appraisal Theory; Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2001). The validity of
these items was derived from their demonstrated utility in numerous studies that address
questions concerning recollective memory and levels of event construal (e.g., Boucher &
Scoboria, 2015; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Rubin et al., 2003; Scoboria et
al., 2014; Trope & Liberman, 2010).
The Behavioural Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), a
measure of individual differences in the tendency to construe actions abstractly, was
included for exploratory purposes based on prior research concerning spontaneous use of
construal levels and adaptive outcomes (e.g., Libby, 2003; Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach,
2009; Vallacher & Wenger, 1989). The BIF includes 25 actions (e.g., “Making a list”)
that are accompanied by concrete and abstract descriptions (“Writing things down” vs.
“Getting organized,” respectively). The number of abstract descriptions individuals
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endorse provide an index of their preference for abstract construal. This measure has
demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .85) and test-retest reliability (r = .91;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1985; see Appendix J). In the present study, α = .85.
Manipulation checks. Likert-scale items assessing personality stability vs. change,
personality change valence (change for the worse vs. change for the better), and mental
focus (experience vs. coherence) were used to determine event valence and mental focus
manipulation fidelity (see Appendix K). These items were derived from Libby and
Eibach (2011a) and employ 8-point rating scales. Consistent with prior work (Boucher &
Scoboria, 2015), two 5-point items assessing material and psychological impact were
used to validate consistency in responding.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one cell in a 2 (event valence: positive vs.
negative) x 2 (mental focus: coherence vs. experience) between-subjects experimental
design. Although main effects of event valence on the dependent variables were not the
primary focus of this study (see, D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2008),
manipulating event valence was necessary in light of evidence showing that healthy
participants are likely to recall twice as many positive events as compared to negative
events from their past (the positivity memory bias; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson,
2003), which could result in unequal cell sizes and valence distributions (i.e., statistical
assumption violations).
Procedure
This study was composed of two parts: Part 1 consisted of a brief online
questionnaire in which participants were randomly assigned to recall a significant
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negative transition (an event that has produced unfavourable personal change) or a
significant positive transition (an event that has produced favourable personal change; see
Appendix A), provide a cue title for this event, and rate it in terms of its associated
emotional valence, emotional intensity, and reference point for evoked emotion. Part 2
took place in a campus computer laboratory at least 10 days later. Participants were
randomly assigned to either an experience focus condition or a coherence focus
condition. They provided a baseline rating of state affect using the SAM, following
which they were presented with their chosen event title and instructed to write a
description of the event for 5 to 7 minutes using either an experience focus (emphasizing
what it was like to experience the event directly, noting specific sensorial and contextual
elements) or a coherence focus (emphasizing the implications of the event within his or
her life, noting its relation to personal characteristics and other life events; see Appendix
D for verbatim instructions). Following the manipulation, all participants provided ratings
for present affect (PANAS), transitional impact (TIS-12), event centrality (CES),
cognitive emotion regulation strategies (CERQ), preference for abstraction (BIF), and the
additional memory characteristics.
RESULTS
A total of 16 cases were excluded from the analyses due to excessive
inconsistency in responding (n = 1), not falling within the minimum 10-day time delay (n
= 3), failing to select a transitional event (n = 1), failing to remember the event provided
at Time 1 (n = 1), responding to the incorrect survey (n = 1), and failing to adhere to the
mental focus manipulation (n = 6). Three univariate outliers (> 3 SDs from the mean)
were also eliminated, as their inclusion in the analyses did not alter the results. Taken
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together, these exclusions constituted 7.11% of the sample (original N = 225). A one-way
ANOVA using the personality change valence item (change for the worse vs. change for
the better) indicated event valence manipulation fidelity, F(1,202) = 36.18, p < .001, Mdiff
= 1.14 [0.76, 1.52], dunb = 0.84, 95% CI [0.55, 1.12]. The same analysis using the mental
focus check item failed to indicate mental focus manipulation fidelity, F(1, 205) = 0.29, p
= .593, Mdiff = 0.17 [-0.44, 0.78], dunb = 0.08 [-0.20, 0.35], however, given this item was
located at the end of the questionnaire (after multiple memory characteristic items), this
finding holds questionable validity. The narratives were analyzed, using a conservative
approach to elimination, and it was determined that 97.2% (n = 209) of the sample
sufficiently (i.e., in 70-100% of their narrative) followed the mental focus instructions.
Prior to the main analyses, the transitional events selected by individuals were
categorized (see Table 2 for proportions). The following categories were identified:
interpersonal growth, interpersonal dissolution, medical/psychological condition,
educational, occupational, travel/relocation, and other. Negative transitions were
primarily (80%) comprised of medical/psychological conditions and interpersonal
dissolutions, while positive transitions mainly (73%) consisted of educational
achievements, interpersonal growth experiences, and travel/relocation. Of worthy note, it
was possible for the same transition type to carry different subjective valence attributions
(e.g., a break-up may be construed as a negative event by some and a positive event by
others). Further, the transition itself may have occurred primarily (71%) or secondarily
(29%) to the participant (e.g., receiving a serious diagnosis oneself vs. a close other
receiving a serious diagnosis). The types of events reported within each valence condition
between the coherence and experience groups were similar.
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Table 2
Transition Types by Experimental Group
Negative Events

Positive Events

Coherence
(n = 54)

Experience
(n = 52)

Coherence
(n = 54)

Experience
(n = 49)

Interpersonal growth

0.00

0.00

0.21

0.29

Interpersonal dissolution

0.37

0.31

0.05

0.06

Medical/psychological

0.44

0.47

0.02

0.06

Educational

0.08

0.11

0.48

0.25

Occupational

0.03

0.05

0.09

0.12

Travel/relocation

0.07

0.04

0.13

0.10

Other

0.00

0.02

0.02

0.12

Note. Proportions of transition types were calculated out of the total within each experimental group:
negative-coherence, negative-experience, positive-coherence, and positive-experience.

Per Cumming (2012), calculations of mean differences (Mdiffs), standardized
unbiased effect sizes (dunb), and associated 95% confidence intervals were used to
analyze the data. This method is conducive to transparent, meta-analytic reporting and
reduces reliance on the interpretation of p-values, which can be unreliable (Cumming,
2012; Kirk, 1996). Correlations and omnibus F-tests, some of which included covariates,
guided the analyses and the reporting of results, however, p-values were not used to
determine their statistical meaning. Refer to Table 3 for descriptives on the main
dependent variables by experimental group.
Transitional Impact and Self-Relevance
Mental focus and event valence effects were examined for the Transitional Impact
Scale (TIS-12), Centrality of Event Scale (CES), and individual items assessing event
importance, personality change, and event connectedness (see Figure 1 for TIS and CES
ratings by group). Average TIS-12 and CES scores were in the upper half of the 1-5 point
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Table 3
Transitional Impact, Self-Relevance, State Affect, Cognitive Emotion Regulation, and
Preference for Abstraction Scores by Experimental Group
Negative Events

Positive Events

Coherence (n = 54)

Experience (n = 52)

Coherence (n = 54)

Experience (n = 49)

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

SD

SD

SD

SD

Psychological
impact (TIS-P)

4.23 [4.07,4.38]

0.57 3.74 [3.51, 3.96] 0.80 3.82 [3.64,4.00] 0.66 3.89 [3.69, 4.09] 0.69

Material impact
(TIS-M)

2.90 [2.59,3.20]

1.11

2.79 [2.48,3.11]

1.12 3.20 [2.97,3.43] 0.85 3.32 [3.02,3.61] 1.04

Event centrality
(CES)

3.63 [3.37,3.90]

0.98

3.45 [3.15,3.75]

1.09 4.02 [3.81,4.23] 0.78 3.87 [3.63,4.11] 0.84

Event importance 5.93 [5.57,6.28]

1.30

5.92 [5.51,6.33]

1.47 6.50 [6.30,6.70] 0.75 6.45 [6.19,6.71] 0.91

Connectedness

4.87 [4.31,5.43]

2.05

4.58 [4.02,5.13]

1.99 4.72 [4.22,5.23] 1.85 5.41 [4.88,5.93] 1.83

Personality
change

6.13 [5.77,6.49]

1.30

5.42 [4.95,5.90]

1.71 5.72 [5.35,6.09] 1.37 6.00 [5.52,6.48] 1.66

Personality
change valencea

5.65 [5.18,6.12]

1.72

5.90 [5.47,6.33]

1.50 6.81 [6.54,7.09] 1.00 7.02 [6.71,7.33] 1.06

Positive affect
(PA)

2.43 [2.17, 2.69]

0.95 2.71 [2.48, 2.94] 0.84 3.04 [2.85,3.24] 0.72 2.81 [2.54, 3.07] 0.92

Negative affect
(NA)

1.77 [1.58,1.96]

0.71 2.03 [1.83, 2.24] 0.75 1.48 [1.35,1.62] 0.50 1.59 [1.40, 1.78] 0.66

Emotion valenceb
-2.25[-2.49,-2.00] 0.90 -1.88[-2.21,-1.56] 1.17 2.06 [1.70,2.41] 1.30 2.06 [1.70,2.42] 1.27
Time 1
Emotion valenceb
-1.37[-1.71,-1.03] 1.25 -1.56[-1.90,-1.21] 1.24 2.28 [2.01,2.55] 1.00 1.88 [1.42,2.33] 1.59
Time 2
Emotion intensity 4.22 [3.76,4.69]

1.70

4.35 [3.88,4.81]

1.68 3.96 [3.54,4.38] 1.53 4.39 [3.95,4.83] 1.53

Positive
regulation
(CERQ-P)

3.48 [3.32,3.63]

0.56

3.45 [3.26,3.64]

0.69 3.43 [3.27,3.59] 0.60 3.47 [3.25,3.68] 0.75

Negative
regulation
(CERQ-N)

2.71 [2.54,2.89]

0.64

2.79 [2.62,2.95]

0.59 2.76 [2.59,2.93] 0.62 2.92 [2.76,3.08] 0.56

Preference for
abstraction (BIF)

0.61 [0.54,0.68]

0.25

0.62 [0.56,0.67]

0.20 0.59 [0.54,0.64] 0.19 0.57 [0.51,0.63] 0.21

Note. a = higher scores indicate change for the better (vs. worse); b = higher scores indicate positive
emotion (vs. negative emotion).
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Figure 1. Transitional Impact Scale (TIS-12) Psychological subscale and Material
subscale, and Centrality of Event Scale (CES) mean ratings by mental focus (coherence
vs. experience) and event valence (positive vs. negative). The error bars show 95%
confidence intervals.

scales and event importance was rated in the upper half of the 1-7 point scale, indicating
that individuals did select personally significant events characterized by change: TISPsychological, M = 3.92 [3.82, 4.01]; TIS-Material, M = 3.05 [2.90, 3.19]; CES, M =
3.74 [3.61, 3.86]; and importance, M = 6.20 [6.04, 6.36]. Psychological impact was rated
higher than material impact for both negative events, Mdiff = 1.14 [0.89, 1.39], dunb = 1.24
[0.98, 1.49], and positive events, Mdiff = 0.60 [0.37, 0.82], dunb = 0.74 [0.52, 0.96].
Psychological impact. For the TIS-Psychological subscale, a coherence focus
resulted in higher average psychological impact scores relative to an experience focus for
negative events, Mdiff = 0.49 [0.22, 0.76], dunb = 0.70 [0.31, 1.10], but not positive events,
Mdiff = 0.07 [-0.19, 0.34], dunb = 0.11 [-0.28, 0.49]. Participants in the negative-coherence
condition produced the highest average rating of psychological impact relative to all other
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groups combined, Mdiff = 0.41 [0.34, 1.30], dunb = 0.47 [0.19, 0.74], and these other
groups (negative-experience, positive-coherence, and positive-experience) did not
statistically differ from each other (CIs included zero). There was no effect of valence on
psychological impact, Mdiff = 0.13 [-0.06, 0.33], dunb = 0.19 [-0.08, 0.46].
Material impact. For the TIS-Material subscale, individuals who recalled a
positive event reported greater material impact, on average, relative to those who recalled
a negative event, Mdiff = 0.41 [0.13, 0.69], dunb = 0.39 [0.12, 0.67]. Mental focus did not
inform material impact ratings overall, Mdiff = 0.00 [-0.29, 0.29], dunb = 0.00 [-0.27, 0.27],
or within valence conditions: for negative events, Mdiff = 0.10 [-0.33, 0.53], dunb = 0.09 [0.29, 0.47]; and for positive events, Mdiff = 0.12 [-0.25, 0.49], dunb = 0.12 [-0.26, 0.51].
Self-relevance. Regarding the CES, individuals in the positive event conditions
reported that their event was more central to their identity and life story, on average,
relative to those in the negative event conditions, Mdiff = 0.40 [0.15, 0.66], dunb = 0.43
[0.16, 0.71]. The positive-coherence group rated their event as more central to their
identity and life story relative to the negative-experience group, Mdiff = 0.57 [0.20, 0.93],
dunb = 0.60 [0.21, 0.99]. The results did not indicate a statistically meaningful effect of
mental focus on event centrality, Mdiff = 0.18 [-0.08, 0.43], dunb = 0.18 [-0.09, 0.46],
however the means were in the expected direction. The positive event groups also
provided higher average ratings of event importance relative to the negative event groups,
Mdiff = 0.56 [0.25, 0.87], dunb = 0.49 [0.21, 0.76]. Importance attributions were not
impacted by mental focus, Mdiff = 0.03 [-0.29, 0.35], dunb = 0.03 [-0.25, 0.30].
With respect to perceived personality change as a result of the event, similar to
the pattern found for psychological impact, a coherence focus was associated with reports
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of greater personality change relative to an experience focus for negative events, Mdiff =
0.71 [0.13, 1.29], dunb = 0.47 [0.08, 0.85], but not positive events, Mdiff = 0.28 [-0.32,
0.88], dunb = 0.18 [-0.21, 0.57]. Those in the negative-experience condition produced the
lowest average ratings of personality change compared to the other groups combined,
Mdiff = 0.53 [0.05, 1.00], dunb = 0.35 [0.03, 0.66], while these other groups (negativecoherence, positive-coherence, and positive-experience) did not statistically differ from
each other (CIs included zero). There was no effect of valence on perceived personality
change, Mdiff = 0.07 [-0.35, 0.49], dunb = 0.05 [-0.23, 0.32].
Finally, regarding connectedness (i.e., how connected the event was perceived to
be with other life events), results revealed no main effects of mental focus, Mdiff = 0.18 [0.26, 0.62], dunb = 0.11 [-0.16, 0.38], or event valence, Mdiff = 0.32 [-0.13, 0.77], dunb =
0.19 [-0.08, 0.46]. Within the experience focus conditions, participants who recalled a
positive event produced higher average connectedness ratings compared to those who
recalled a negative event, Mdiff = 0.83 [0.07, 1.59], dunb = 0.43 [0.03, 0.82], whereas the
coherence focus groups did not differ, Mdiff = 0.15 [-0.59, 0.89], dunb = 0.08 [-0.30, 0.45].
All other between-group differences for impact and self-relevance items approximated
zero.
Present Affect
To test whether individuals’ reference point for evoked emotion moderated the
effect of mental focus on post-manipulation positive and negative affect over and above
pre-manipulation affect, I first examined whether these variables correlated using a twotailed bivariate correlational analysis, bootstrapped using 1000 samples. No statistically
reliable correlations were found within the positive event conditions, or the negative
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event conditions (CIs for correlations included zero). It therefore made little sense to
continue with the planned hierarchical multiple regression analyses, and I turned to an
examination of mean differences and effect sizes using 2 (mental focus) x 2 (event
valence) x 2 (emotional reference point) ANCOVAs, controlling for baseline affect
(SAM ratings) to acquire adjusted group means (refer to Figure 2 for a depiction of these
results).
Negative affect. For negative affect, the results yielded small-to-moderate effects
of mental focus, Mdiff = 0.21 [0.04, 0.38], dunb = 0.34 [0.06, 0.61], and event valence, Mdiff
= 0.31 [0.14, 0.48], dunb = 0.49 [0.21, 0.76]. Individuals who used a coherence focus
reported lower negative affect, on average, relative to those who used an experience
focus and, in line with assigned valence conditions, those who recalled a negative event
reported greater negative affect, on average, compared to those who recalled a positive
event. Accordingly, the negative-experience group reported greater negative affect
relative to the negative-coherence group, Mdiff = 0.31 [0.07, 0.55], dunb = 0.50 [0.11,
0.89], the positive-experience group, Mdiff = 0.41 [0.16, 0.65], dunb = 0.65 [0.25, 1.05],
and especially the positive-coherence group, Mdiff = 0.52 [0.28, 0.76], dunb = 0.82 [0.43,
1.22], and these last three groups did not statistically differ from each other (CIs included
zero). Between-group contrasts did not reveal mental focus-by-emotional reference point
interactions (differences were near zero); it is worth noting that these contrasts entailed
small and uneven cell sizes (ranging from n = 23 to n = 31).
Positive affect. The same analyses were carried out for positive affect revealing an
effect of valence, Mdiff = 0.28 [0.05. 0.50], dunb = 0.34 [0.06, 0.61], with those in the
positive event conditions reporting greater positive affect, on average, relative to those in
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Figure 2. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) Positive Affect (PA) and
Negative Affect (NA) adjusted mean ratings by mental focus (coherence vs. experience)
and event valence (positive vs. negative), controlling for Self-Assessment Mannequin
(SAM) Pleasure and Arousal. E = the percentage of participants in the group indicating
that their emotions mostly resulted from thinking about what it was like to experience the
event; the remaining participants indicated that their emotions mostly resulted from
thinking about the broader consequences of the event. The scales were anchored 1 to 5.
The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

the negative event conditions. The results did not indicate an effect of mental focus on
positive affect overall, Mdiff = 0.02 [-0.22, 0.26], dunb = 0.02 [-0.25, 0.30], or within
emotional referent groups, where between group differences approximated zero (ns
ranged from 22 to 31).
Finally, positive affect mean ratings were found to be statistically greater than
negative affect mean ratings for both positive events, Mdiff = 1.40 [1.20, 1.59], dunb = 1.99
[1.65, 2.32], and negative events, Mdiff = 0.67 [0.44, 0.89], dunb = 0.81 [0.59, 1.03].
Emotion ratings pre vs. post mental focus manipulation. Emotion valence ratings
pre- versus post-mental focus manipulation were compared using a 2 (mental focus) x 2
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(event valence) x 2 (time point) repeated measures ANOVA to acquire adjusted group
means (refer to Table 4 for effects across time). Sphericity assumed, the results indicated
a small effect of time, Mdiff = 0.31 [0.07, 0.54], dunb = 0.25 [0.11, 0.39], wherein emotion
ratings tended to become more positive (and less negative), on average, from Time 1 to
Time 2. Effects of mental focus and event valence over time were qualified the
interaction: Those in the negative-coherence condition showed a greater shift toward
positive emotion over time, while the other groups showed no statistically reliable change
in emotion ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 (CIs included zero). At each time point, those
in the positive (vs. negative) transition conditions reported greater positive (relative to
negative) emotion when recalling their transitional event: Time 1, Mdiff = 4.12 [3.80,
4.44], dunb = 3.52 [3.08, 3.95]; Time 2, Mdiff = 3.55 [3.20, 3.90], dunb = 2.76 [2.38, 3.14].
All other between-group contrasts were null (differences were near zero).
Emotional intensity. Identical analyses were carried out for emotional intensity
(refer to Table 5). Sphericity assumed, the results indicated a marginal decrease in
emotional intensity ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 for those in the positive event groups,
Mdiff = -0.33 [-0.77, -0.11], dunb = -0.21 [-0.41, -0.01], but not negative event groups, Mdiff
= 0.16 [-0.27, 0.59], dunb = 0.10 [-0.09, 0.29]. Emotional intensity ratings did not differ
between positive and negative event groups at Time 1, Mdiff = 0.38 [-0.05, 0.82], dunb =
0.24 [-0.03, 0.51], or Time 2, Mdiff = 0.12 [-0.33, 0.56], dunb = 0.07 [-0.20, 0.34]. Group
contrasts did not reveal a main effect of time, or other interaction effects (CIs included
zero).
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Table 4
Emotional Valence Ratings Pre versus Post Mental Focus Manipulation
Condition

Time 1

Time 2

Difference from Time 1 to Time 2

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Mdiff [95% CI]

dunb [95% CI]

Negative
(n = 53)

-2.25 [-2.56,-1.93]

1.17

-1.38 [-1.73,-1.03]

1.28

0.87 [0.40,1.34]

0.71 [0.41,1.01]

Positive
(n = 54)

2.06 [1.74,2.37]

1.17

2.28 [1.93,2.62]

1.28

0.22 [-0.25,0.69]

0.18 [-0.09,0.45]

Negative
(n = 52)

-1.89 [-2.20,-1.57]

1.17

-1.56 [-1.91,-1.21]

1.28

0.33 [-0.15,0.80]

0.27 [-0.01,0.54]

Positive
(n = 49)

2.06 [1.73,2.39]

1.16

1.88 [1.52,2.24]

1.28

-0.18 [-0.67,0.31]

-0.15 [-0.43,0.13]

Coherence

Experience

Note. Based on adjusted means; sphericity assumed.

Table 5
Emotional Intensity Ratings Pre versus Post Mental Focus Manipulation
Condition

Time 1

Time 2

Difference from Time 1 to Time 2

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Mdiff [95% CI]

dunb [95% CI]

Negative
(n = 54)

4.06 [3.63,4.48]

1.59

4.22 [3.79,4.66]

1.61

0.17 [-0.44,0.78]

0.10 [-0.16,0.37]

Positive
(n = 53)

4.30 [3.87,4.73]

1.59

3.96 [3.53,4.40]

1.62

-0.34 [-0.96,0.28]

-0.21 [-0.48,0.06]

Negative
(n = 52)

4.19 [3.76,4.63]

1.59

4.35 [3.91,4.79]

1.62

0.15 [-0.47,0.78]

0.10 [-0.18,0.37]

Positive
(n = 49)

4.71 [4.27,5.16]

1.59

4.39 [3.93,4.84]

1.61

-0.33 [-0.97,0.32]

-0.20 [-0.48,0.08]

Coherence

Experience

Note. Based on adjusted means; sphericity assumed.
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Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies
To test whether personality change valence moderated the effect of mental focus
on cognitive emotion regulation strategies in response to stressful life events in general, I
first examined whether these items correlated using a two-tailed bivariate correlational
analysis with 1000 samples bootstrapping. Mental focus and personality change valence
were not found to correlate with each other or with any regulation strategies (CIs on
correlations included zero), suggesting insufficient grounds to continue with moderation
analyses.
I then explored cognitive emotion regulation strategies by experimental condition
using 2 (mental focus) x 2 (event valence) ANOVAs. Small-to-moderate effects of event
valence emerged for self-blame, Mdiff = 0.34 [0.05, 0.63], dunb = 0.32 [0.05, 0.59], and the
need for acceptance, Mdiff = 0.28 [0.06, 0.51], dunb = 0.34 [0.07, 0.62], such that those
who recalled a negative event indicated that they tended to assume less responsibility for
unpleasant events and that they generally felt a greater need to accept such events, on
average, relative to those who recalled a positive event. The results did not reveal effects
of event valence on the remaining regulation strategies (blaming others, rumination,
catastrophizing, putting into perspective, positive refocusing, refocus on planning, and
positive reappraisal). Finally, mental focus was not found to affect ratings on any
cognitive emotion regulation strategies overall, or within valence conditions (betweengroup differences approximated zero). Controlling for BIF scores (due to correlations
subsequently noted) did not alter these findings.
Ancillary Analyses
Imagery perspective. With regard to the imagery perspective individuals used
36

when recalling their transitional event, the results indicated that they tended to use a
greater proportion of first-person imagery, M = 3.35 [3.02, 3.69], relative to third-person
imagery overall (8-point scale ranging from entirely first-person to entirely third-person).
Group contrasts did not reveal effects of mental focus, Mdiff = 0.24 [-0.38, 0.86], dunb =
0.11 [-0.17, 0.38], event valence, Mdiff = 0.05 [-0.57, 0.67], dunb = 0.02 [-0.25, 0.29], or
interactions (differences were near zero; see Table 6 for descriptives on memory
characteristics by experimental group).
Two-tailed bivariate correlational analyses, bootstrapped using 1000 samples,
were used to assess relationships amongst imagery perspective, self-distancing,
personality change, personality change valence, and re-experiencing. Imagery perspective
was found to correlate with self-distancing, r(207) = 0.72 [0.61, 0.81], such that greater
use of third-person imagery coincided with reports of greater self-distancing. Both
imagery perspective and self-distancing correlated with feeling of re-experiencing,
wherein greater use of third-person imagery or greater self-distancing was associated
with lower feelings of re-experiencing, r(207) = -0.17 [-0.32, -0.02], and r(207) = -0.28 [0.41, -0.13], respectively. All other correlations were null (CIs included zero).
Additional Memory Characteristics. Group contrasts were used to examine the
influence of mental focus and event valence on additional memory characteristics. Smallto-moderate mental focus effects were found for clarity, Mdiff = 0.53 [0.18, 0.88], dunb =
0.42 [0.14, 0.70], perceptual detail, Mdiff = 0.55 [0.18, 0.92], dunb = 0.41[0.13, 0.68],
reliving, Mdiff = 0.46 [0.01, 0.92], dunb = 0.28 [0.01, 0.55], and reaction, Mdiff = 0.54 [0.01,
1.08], dunb = 0.27 [0.01, 0.55], with those in the experience focus conditions providing
higher ratings on all of these variables. Effects of event valence were also found for
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Table 6
Memory Characteristic Ratings by Experimental Group
Negative Events

Positive Events

Coherence (n = 54)

Experience (n = 52)

Coherence (n = 54)

Experience (n = 49)

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

Imagery
perspectivea

3.50 [2.88,4.12]

2.29

3.25 [2.59,3.91]

2.37 2.98 [2.39,3.57] 2.17 3.71 [3.06,4.36] 2.26

Self-immersion/
distance

3.28 [2.74,3.82]

1.98

2.65[2.17,3.13]

1.73 2.91 [2.41,3.40] 1.80 2.82 [2.32,3.32] 1.74

Clarityb

5.25[4.81,5.69]

1.61

5.83 [5.55,6.10]

0.98 5.43 [5.07,5.79] 1.31 5.87 [5.59,6.15] 0.97

Vividness

5.36 [4.89,5.83]

1.71 5.49 [5.11, 5.87] 1.36 5.04 [4.65,5.42] 1.41 5.47 [5.11,5.83] 1.26

Perceptual detail

5.11 [4.67,5.56]

1.63

5.50 [5.19,5.81]

1.11 4.72 [4.33,5.11] 1.42 5.41 [5.09,5.72] 1.10

Reliving

3.74 [3.26,4.22]

1.75

4.23 [3.77,4.69]

1.65 4.07 [3.65,4.50] 1.56 4.57 [4.11,5.03] 1.61

Reaction

3.15 [2.61,3.68]

1.96

3.78 [3.19,4.38]

2.12 3.22 [2.72,3.72] 1.83 3.71 [3.17,4.25] 1.88

Re-experiencingc

4.27 [3.87,4.66]

1.46

4.48 [4.13,4.83]

1.24 4.27 [3.92,4.61] 1.27 4.66 [4.31,5.01] 1.21

Difficulty
picturing

2.98 [2.43,3.53]

2.02

3.48 [2.94,4.02]

1.94 2.04 [1.71,2.36] 1.18 2.10 [1.69,2.52] 1.42

Story complexity

3.98 [3.49,4.48]

1.82

4.27 [3.82,4.72]

1.62 3.47 [2.98,3.97] 1.79 3.27 [2.75,3.78] 1.78

Subjective event
duration

4.74 [4.23,5.25]

1.88

4.87 [4.31,5.42]

1.98 4.07 [3.68,4.47] 1.45 3.81 [3.32,4.30] 1.68

Objective event
duration

2.83 [2.49,3.18]

1.26

2.40 [2.06,2.74]

1.23 2.61 [2.24,2.98] 1.37 2.59 [2.19,3.00] 1.41

Subjective
4.87 [3.97,5.77]
temporal distance

3.30

4.88 [3.98,5.78]

3.23 4.46 [3.69,5.23] 2.83 4.96 [4.05,5.87] 3.16

Objective
5.83 [4.41,7.26]
temporal distance

5.22

3.88 [2.76,5.01]

4.00 2.96 [2.05,3.88] 3.36 2.98 [1.95,4.01] 3.56

Thought/talked

1.81

4.65 [4.13,5.18]

1.90 4.44 [3.97,4.92] 1.73 4.53 [4.03,5.03] 1.73

4.80 [4.30,5.29]

SD

SD

Note. a = higher scores indicate greater third-person (vs. first-person) imagery; b = composite of three
items: clarity of location, objects, and people; c.= composite of three items: reliving, emotional reexperiencing, and time travel.
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SD

difficulty picturing, Mdiff = 1.11 [0.64, 1.58], dunb = 0.66 [0.37, 0.94], narrative
complexity, Mdiff = 0.75 [0.26, 1.24], dunb = 0.42 [0.15, 0.70], subjective event duration,
Mdiff = 0.80 [0.31, 1.29], dunb = 0.45 [0.17, 0.73], and objective temporal distance Mdiff =
1.92 [0.78, 3.05], dunb = 0.46 [0.18, 0.74]. Individuals who recalled a negative event were
more likely to report that, on average, the event was more difficult to picture, more
complex, felt like is lasted longer, and was dated to have occurred in the more distal past.
Events were also generally rated as having occurred over the course of many days to one
month, M = 2.61 [2.43, 2.79]. No main effects emerged for items assessing feeling of reexperiencing, vividness, objective event duration, subjective temporal distance, and
frequency with which the event was thought or talked about (between-group differences
were near zero).
Behavioural Identification Form. To assess whether individual differences in the
tendency to abstract (BIF scores) were associated with variables related to self-change
(based on Libby & Eibach, 2011a) or emotional valence (based on Ayduk & Kross, 2010;
Kross & Ayduk, 2011), two-tailed bivariate correlational analyses, bootstrapped using
1000 samples, were used.
Personality change. BIF scores were not found to correlate with personality
change, r(200) = 0.09 [-0.05, 0.22], however, they did correlate with personality change
valence for negative events, r(101) = 0.32 [0.16, 0.47], such that the selection of more
abstract BIF responses coincided with reports of greater change for the better as a result
of the event. BIF scores and change valence were not related for positive events, r(97) = 0.03 [-0.20, 0.15].
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Affect. Greater preferences for abstraction (BIF scores) correlated with higher
ratings of positive affect, r(104) = 0.25 [0.05, 0.43], and lower ratings of negative affect,
r(104) = -0.23 [-0.41, -0.05], for those in the negative event conditions, but not for those
in the positive event conditions: positive affect, r(100) = 0.19 [0.01, 0.37]; negative
affect, r(100) = -0.07 [-0.28, 0.12].
CERQ. BIF scores were found to correlate with rumination, r(206) = -0.16 [-0.30,
-0.02], blaming oneself, r(206) = -0.19 [-0.33, -0.06], blaming others, r(206) = -0.15 [0.29, -0.01], and positive reappraisal, r(206) = 0.20 [0.07, 0.33]. As BIF scores increased,
reported inclinations to ruminate and blame oneself and others for unpleasant events
decreased, while reported tendencies to engage in positive reappraisal increased. For
negative events, increases in BIF scores corresponded with lower levels of rumination,
r(104) = -0.32 [-0.48, -0.14], and self-blame, r(104) = -0.25 [-0.43, -0.07], and higher
levels of positive refocusing, r(104) = 0.23 [0.04, 0.40], and positive reappraising, r(104)
= 0.22 [0.03, 0.38]. For positive events, increases in BIF scores were associated with
increases in positive reappraisal, r(100) = 0.20 [0.01, 0.37]. All other CERQ subscales
did not statistically correlate with BIF scores (CIs included zero).
DISCUSSION
In light of theoretical and empirical discrepancies concerning the effects of
cognitive strategies for autobiographical event representation on emotion and meaning
making, along with the relative lack of literature examining positive transitions, this study
set out to investigate how focusing on the concrete details (experience focus) versus
broader life significance (coherence focus) of self-selected positive versus negative past
transitions influences appraisals of event impact, self-relevance, and present affect.
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Ancillary aims were to explore effects of mental focus and event valence on cognitive
emotion regulation strategies and phenomenological aspects of recollection, along with
potential relationships with individual preferences for abstraction.
Transitional Impact and Self-Relevance
Findings for transitional impact and self-relevance partly replicated prior work
(Boucher & Scoboria, 2015), in that overall psychological impact ratings were higher
than material impact ratings, and a coherence focus was associated with ratings of greater
psychological impact and personality change as a result of the event, relative to an
experience focus, but only for those who recalled a negative transition. For individuals
who recalled a positive transition, ratings of psychological impact and personality change
did not differ as a function of mental focus. This offers support for the self-enhancement
motive in suggesting that individuals are more inclined to reconcile negative transitions
(which prompt views of self-decline) as compared to positive transitions (which prompt
views of self-improvement). In other words, negative transitions appear to pose a greater
threat to the enhancement of the current self, via the implication that one’s past self was
more favourable in comparison.
Self-enhancement (Sanitioso, 2008) and self-coherence (McAdams, 1997) aims
are, however, not mutually exclusive, and in fact, the current findings illustrate their
simultaneous operation. Given peoples’ desire to maintain a sense of improvement over
time, it follows that present selves are generally held in higher regard relative to past
selves (e.g., Baumeister, 1998). In prompting individuals to contemplate positive
transitions, the valence change (from less favourable to more favourable) necessarily
coincides with, and aptly precedes, current views of the self (self-consistency), whereas
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for negative transitions, the trajectory of self-change (from more favourable to less
favourable) disagrees with the ideal for present self-views (self-inconsistency). Perhaps
then, the motive to reconcile past events is not solely driven by perceptions of change in
the self, but rather, whether the valence of such change accords with the default valence
of current self-views. This is to say that for negative transitions, the desire to maintain a
sense of self-continuity over time firmly collides with the need to preserve a current
positive self-view, and both objectives may explain why appraisals of negative transitions
were more sensitive to mental focus manipulations relative to those for positive
transitions.
Specifically, because a coherence focus incites an overarching view of how a
significant negative transition contrasts with other events within one’s (generally stable
and positive; McAdams, 2001; Walker et al., 2003) life narrative, while an experience
focus entails no such juxtaposition, it is staged to magnify evaluations of psychological
impact and personality change (while an experience focus is positioned to minimize or
maintain these appraisals). Again, this is particularly true for negative transitions because
they pose a greater threat to self-enhancement and self-coherence objectives relative to
positive transitions. That individuals who focused on the coherence features of a negative
event produced the highest ratings of psychological impact relative to all other groups
(while these other groups did not differ from each other) agrees with this account,
although it is important to note that the direction and magnitude of mental focus effects
eclipses the current research design. In order to fully understand how mental focus
informs psychological impact and personality change ratings from baseline (i.e., whether
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a coherence focus drives increases, an experience focus drives decreases, or both) a prepost research design, with the inclusion of a control group, would be necessary.
Regarding other elements of event meaning, in light of prior research (Boucher &
Scoboria, 2015), it is surprising that appraisals of material impact, event centrality, and
importance did not vary in accordance with mental focus but did vary as a function of
event valence, such that ratings were greater for positive events relative to negative
events. Methodological differences amongst studies are worth noting here. Firstly, while
Boucher and Scoboria (2015) also prompted events characterised by significant change,
the current study added an explicit request for valenced change. Secondly, although the
present hypotheses regarding event valence rested upon Boucher and Scoboria’s (2015)
finding that emotional valence, via statistical control, did not alter their results, it is
important to acknowledge that this item constitutes a crude estimate of event valence and
stands in contrast to direct prompts to retrieve events begetting significant positive or
negative personal change; that is, measurement of the emotional valence associated with
events may be distinct from the selection of events based on the valence of change they
are thought to have produced. Boucher and Scoboria (2015) also noted a positivity bias
for past events, meaning they were generally associated with greater positive emotion
during recall, however, using their event cue, it was also possible for the change
characterising events to be considered neutral (i.e., not necessarily strongly positive or
negative, just different). As a third methodological difference, participants in the current
study were asked to retrieve the same event on two occasions, at least 10 days apart,
which possibly explains why material impact, centrality, and importance ratings remained
relatively impervious to mental focus manipulations in this study but not in Boucher and
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Scoboria’s (2015) study. Differences in event cues (i.e., in terms of allowances for
default neutrality or skewed emotionality) and/or the frequency of retrieval prompts may
therefore explain divergent findings. A repeated measures design with a ‘non-valenced
event cue’ condition would be necessary to elucidate these effects.
Nevertheless, that positive events were associated with greater material impact,
centrality, and importance ratings, compared to negative events, offers further support for
both self-enhancement and self-coherence motives, in that positive transitions, and the
material changes they produce, more favourably define (enhancement), and agree with
(coherence), a generally rosy view of the current self.
Why did mental focus effects emerge for psychological impact but not material
impact? This may relate to the fact that materially-based event attributions (e.g., changes
in places frequented, things owned) involve more concrete, factual elements than
psychologically-based appraisals (e.g., changes in attitude, sense of self), which are more
abstract, and thus, more malleable in accordance with mental focus. In line with this idea,
Boucher and Scoboria (2015) found mental focus effects to be greater for judgements of
psychological impact compared to material impact. Related to their being bound by a
greater degree of objectivity, perhaps appraisals of material impact become congealed
with repeated retrieval, making them less changeable following mental focus
manipulations at a later time, while (unbound) appraisals of psychological impact remain
open to renegotiation. It would be interesting to investigate whether these factors could
account for why overall material impact ratings were lower in the current study (M =
3.05) as compared to Boucher and Scoboria (2015, Study 1, M = 3.52) while
psychological impact ratings were similar (M = 3.92 vs. M = 3.87, respectively). Also
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noteworthy, ratings on event centrality and importance were near the scale ceilings,
suggesting there may be an upper limit to reappraising the material components of more
self-defining events. This would agree with Beike and Crone’s (2012) suggestion that
self-defining memories are tagged with fixed meaning that is stored with the memory,
with the added caveat that particular forms of meaning (i.e., psychological impact) and
particular valenced events (i.e., negative) may not adhere to this logic.
Possibly for similar reasons, ratings of how connected transitional events were to
other life events did not vary according to mental focus or event valence, which disagrees
with Boucher and Scoboria’s (2015) findings. In addition to methodological differences
already discussed, this finding may relate to the fact that valenced transitions, which are
essentially self-defining, afford contrasting memories less “space” within the cognitive
field (i.e., according to gestalt figure-ground principles; Duval, Silvia, & Lalwani, 2001);
that is, these personally significant valenced transitions may be distinct amongst
comparison set of prior experiences, which obscures estimates of the degree to which
they are embedded within extended memory networks. Perceived connectedness may,
therefore, constitute another component of meaning that remains fixed to, and stored
with, personally salient valenced memories (Beike & Crone, 2012).
Contrasting events that vary in their personal salience (e.g., transitional/important
vs. non-transitional/mundane) may further define the boundaries within which mental
focus exerts its effects. It should be noted however, that previous research (Berntsen &
Bohn, 2010; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997) suggests that a request to retrieve important (vs.
mundane) events affords access to perceptually rich event representations experienced as
emotional and consequential when they occurred (characteristics that make transitional
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vs. non-transitional events differently suited to mental focus manipulations and
assessments of emotional reference points).
Present Affect
Similar to findings for psychological impact and personality change, mental focus
effects on negative affect were confined to the negative transition conditions; for these
individuals, a coherence focus resulted in reports of lower negative affect relative to an
experience focus. Findings did not support the anticipated moderating role of emotional
reference point (i.e., whether emotions derived from thinking about what it was like to
experience the event vs. its broader consequences), however, they agreed with research
suggesting that a self-distanced view of negative past experiences produces less
emotional distress compared to a self-immersed view (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross
& Ayduk, 2011). These authors contend that a self-distanced perspective allows the self
that is contemplating an event to become psychologically detached from the self that has
experienced it, which serves to reduce associated emotion. The inclusion of positive
events in the current study, however, qualifies this assertion: In so far as self-distancing
serves a “psychological removal function,” and to the extent self-distanced versus selfimmersed perspectives operate likewise to coherence versus experience mental foci,
respectively (which the current findings suggest), then we might expect positive affect to
vary in accordance with mental focus for those who recalled positive transitions,
however, the findings do not support this. Likewise to psychological impact and
personality change, it appears that the negative affect associated with negative events is
more receptive to available cognitive strategies for event representation (i.e., mental
focus) relative to the positive affect that accompanies positive events, which does not
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arouse such aversion, dissonance, and/or desire to resolve within the context of one’s
current self-view and life narrative.
The finding that levels of negative and positive affect coincided with positive and
negative event conditions, respectively, while ratings of negative affect overall were
lower than those for positive affect, supports the idea that negative events and associated
affect are subject to increased cognitive management. It also agrees with research
demonstrating that negative affect associated with events fades faster over time relative to
positive affect in order to enhance the current self (Fading Affect Bias; Holmes, 1970;
Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1977).
On the surface, it would appear that the findings for affect do not align with Libby
and Eibach’s (2011b) suggestion that one’s currently operating self-theory or default
assumption about an event (i.e., reference point for evoked emotion) should moderate the
effects of imagery perspective (hence, mental focus) on emotion. However, upon further
deconstruction of the methodologies used, the findings can be said to lend support, at
least in part, for their view; that is, in formulating my hypotheses, I neglected to specify
that the event valence manipulation was also a self-theory manipulation (i.e., change for
the better vs. change for the worse), due in part to the fact that prior research has not
considered such self-theories (but rather, self-change vs. self-stability, Libby & Eibach,
2011a; high self-esteem vs. low self-esteem, Libby et al., 2011). Recall that self-theories
pertaining to change versus stability were used to explain the effects of self-distancing on
the adaptive reconciliation of negatively charged events. That mental focus exerted
effects on negative affect for negative, but not positive, events then suggests that it is not
self-change per se that accounts for these previous findings (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010;
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Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005), but also the valence shift
characterizing such change (decline vs. improvement). This points to an interesting study
in which mental focus and event-type manipulations are crossed: mental focus (coherence
vs. experience) by self-change (transitional vs. non-transitional) by event valence
(positive vs. negative).
Due to the fact there were two possible moderating variables in the current study,
where one was fixed (event valence) and the other was random (emotional referent), it is
difficult to ascertain to what extent these methods appropriately addressed the hypothesis
that individuals’ reference points for evoked emotion alone would moderate the effects of
mental focus on associated affect. Results concerning the role of emotional referent are
also tenuous due to small and uneven group sizes, multiple control variables, and the fact
that this item has not been validated via earlier research. A larger sample, hence greater
statistical power, may elucidate whether one’s emotional referent, together with a theory
of valenced self-change, can inform current affect. Designs that employ an emotional
referent manipulation or post-mental focus manipulation measures of self-change and
emotional reference point (for important, but not necessarily transitional, events) would
serve this end.
Furthermore, findings that those who employed an experience focus on a negative
transition provided the highest average rating of negative affect relative to other groups,
that those in the positive (vs. negative) event conditions reported greater positive affect,
and that emotion tended to become more positive (and less negative) following the use of
a coherence (vs. experience) focus at Time 2, suggests that some mental focus-by-event
valence shifts may be more beneficial than others in terms of affect. Specifically, the
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current findings suggest that shifts from negative-experience to negative-coherence, or
from negative-experience to a positive event using either mental focus, would produce
greater reductions in negative affect and/or greater increases in positive affect. A
controlled within-subjects design would systematically address the interplay amongst
repeated retrieval of valenced events and the boundaries within which mental focus
shifting informs appraisals of impact and affect.
In any case, Libby and Eibach (2011b) contend that in order for a third-person
imagery (hence, coherence focus) to promote adaptive coping, an adaptive framework
must also be specified to guide the meaning-making and emotional reaction that occurs.
Reasoning backwards from the current results, the framework appears to be this: A
coherence (vs. experience) focus promotes appraisals of greater impact and self-change
as a result of an event along with lower negative affect, but only if the event is
characterized by change for the worse (self-theory). When the event is characterized by
change for the better, the usefulness of a coherence focus is diminished or entirely
unnecessary.
It is worthwhile to discuss the extent to which mental focus effects may be
considered ‘adaptive’ per se given support for both self-enhancement and self-coherence
motives in the current study. Self-enhancement, for instance, has been suggested to
inspire “higher motivation, greater persistence, more effective performance…greater
success” (Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 199) and adaptive coping in terms of positive actionorientations in the face of challenge (Walker & Skowronski, 2009). Other research,
however, indicates that self-enhancement can also lead to poor coping in terms of a lack
of constructive thinking (Neckar, 2013). Further, Robins and Beer (2001) contend that
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while self-enhancement produces short-term benefits (e.g., keeps people in a positive
mood and fosters creative and productive work), it can also promote long-term costs
(e.g., ego-involvement, social isolation, and lower academic success). Research
pertaining to self-coherence, however, is clearer on its adaptive value. For instance,
perceptions of self-continuity have been shown to predict individuals’ ability to manage
challenges, their interest in new opportunities (Iyer & Jetten, 2011), use of active coping
styles (e.g., planning and taking action) instead of passive coping styles (e.g., denial;
Smith, Wethington, & Zhan, 1996), and their overall psychological adjustment (e.g., in
terms of self-esteem, general contentment, depression, and anxiety; Bigler, Greg,
Neimeyer, & Brown, 2001). Finally, as exemplified by the self-reflection paradox (Kross
& Ayduk, 2011), it is not simply that individuals engage in more reflective thought about
negative experiences, but rather how they go about doing so, that informs healthy
meaning making and emotion regulation. A coherence focus, then, constitutes an adaptive
cognitive strategy in so far as it supports peoples’ ability to explain how a past self and
associated memory relate to their current self-concept and life story as a whole, even in
the face of potentially illusory optimism, which in turn, reinforces their ability to cope
with challenges and changes encountered in their everyday lives.
Within a clinical domain, where negative past transitions are likely to be the focus
of therapeutic work, the current findings suggest that encouraging discussion or written
reflection around how a negative experience (even one that remains emotionally intense
over time) relates to one’s accomplishments, personal relationships, self-concept, and
other events within his or her life-story can induce a view that they have undergone
significant psychological change as a result of that event while also reducing associated
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negative affect, as compared to reflecting on the event without a such a model to guide
the meaning making process (likened to rumination), or simply rehashing the details of
the experience itself. Indeed, various effective therapies include conceptually similar
forms of ‘psychological distancing’ strategies (e.g., Beck, 1970; Linehan, 1993; Resick et
al., 2008), and many well-known theories regard the establishment and maintenance of an
integrated self as integral to adaptive functioning and psychological well-being (e.g., selfpsychology theory; Kohut, 1977; humanistic theory; Rogers, 1965; needs hierarchy
theory; Maslow, 1998). This study, therefore, highlights how relatively simple cognitive
strategies for autobiographical event representation can uniquely contribute to mental
health outcomes.
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies
Contrary to what might be predicted based on Cox and McAdams’ (2014) work,
mental focus and personality change valence did not inform ratings on any cognitive
emotion regulation strategies. There are a number of methodological differences to
consider in interpreting these results. Firstly, Cox and McAdams (2014) directed
participants to discuss the details of high-point and low-point events followed by their
broader implications, likened to a shift from an experience focus to a coherence focus,
whereas individuals in the current study were prompted to use one focus or the other.
This suggests that mental focus shifting might matter in terms of the kind of meaning
people derive when thinking about events and the cognitive emotion regulation strategies
they predict. The assumption here is that while coherence and experience mental foci are
thought to produce qualitatively distinct forms of meaning, their combination may
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elucidate a meaning-making process by which adaptive versus maladaptive regulation
strategies emerge.
Secondly, whereas Cox and McAdams (2014) coded negative and positive forms
of meaning in their participants’ narratives (informed by, Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence,
2004), the current study equated a coherence focus to Cox and McAdams’ (2014)
definition of meaning making in which “the narrator steps back from the episodic action
of the experience and reflects upon the meaning of the episode with regard to the self and
the world” (p. 67), and relied upon the personality change valence item (for better vs.
worse) as continuous indicator of its valence. This differential reliance on qualitative
versus quantitative measures of meaning likely implicates the degree to which findings
for these constructs can be contrasted across studies.
Furthermore, the methods used by Cox and McAdams (2014) do not appropriately
disentangle meaning making from narrative style. Indeed, as the present findings
regarding the BIF illustrate, peoples’ preferences for abstract (vs. concrete) descriptions
can incite reports of greater change for the better, greater positive affect, and lower
negative affect as a result of negative events. Moreover, higher preferences for
abstraction were associated with lower tendencies to ruminate, blame oneself, and blame
others, and greater positive reappraisal. Perhaps then, it is not valenced meaning making
per se that predicts adaptive versus maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies,
but rather, it is peoples’ trait-like autobiographical reasoning styles (e.g., Habermas &
Bluck, 2000). Certainly, this would explain why “meaning making” predicted regulation
strategies - also relatively stable styles (Garnefski et al., 2001) - two years later for Cox
and McAdams (2014) but not within a single session according to retrieval
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manipulations, as in the present study. Also, within the current research paradigm, the
CERQ was placed at the end of the study, after multiple items prompting individuals to
assess various phenomenological features, which may have further limited the degree to
which cognitive emotion regulation strategies could be influenced by mental foci. Recall
that a similar rationale was used to explain why the mental focus manipulation check
item did not verify the manipulations. It would be worthwhile for future studies to
consider the amount and content of items preceding the CERQ and mental focus check
item, and in the case of the latter, to also evaluate written narratives according to relevant
mental focus content.
In any case, due to the fact “meaning making” is such a broad concept that is
measured in many different ways in the literature, in addition to the fact that some forms
of meaning may vary as a function of retrieval context or individual characteristics (e.g.,
narrative style), a valuable research endeavor would be to deconstruct aspects of meaning
and assess the degree to which meaning-making scales, coding schemes, narrative styles,
and cognitive strategies for event representation (e.g., mental focus, imagery perspective,
and self-distance) converge.
As a final note, in considering the effects of event valence on self-blame and need
for acceptance, a familiar theme emerges. Specifically, that those who recalled a negative
(vs. positive) event indicated that they assumed less responsibility for unpleasant
experiences and felt a greater urge to try to accept them, agrees with the rational for why
mental focus effects on psychological impact, self-change, and negative affect were
constrained to negative transition conditions: People appear to be more motivated to
resolve negative events as compared to positive events.

53

Perceived Closure in the Reconciliation of Positive Versus Negative Events
Many studies examining the effects of self-distancing have focused on negative
events that, at the time of retrieval, were considered to be unresolved and emotionally
evocative (e.g., Auduk & Kross, 2010). Crawley (2010) has shown that “open” (i.e.,
unresolved) memories are generally more emotionally negative compared to “closed”
(i.e., resolved) memories, which tend to be more emotionally positive. Therefore, the
desire to resolve past experiences may have informed the selection of transitions in the
current study, contributing to their being appraised as negative versus positive and to
their disparate sensitivities to mental focus manipulations. That is, the reconciliation of
events, via their susceptibility to retrieval manipulations, may not only depend on the
degree to which they reflect poorly on the current self (self-enhancement motive), and the
degree to which they disagree with current self-conceptions (self-coherence motive), but
also on the degree to which a subjective resolution has been reached, and for negative
events, a coherence (vs. experience) focus aptly lends itself to this purpose.
Using a similar experimental paradigm, Crawley (2010; Study 2) manipulated the
imagery perspective participants used to describe “open” negative events and found that
the use of third-person (vs. first-person) imagery resulted in these events being rated as
significantly more closed, more discrepant from the current self, less relived, less intense,
less physical, less emotionally negative, and more emotionally positive during recall. To
the extent negative transitions in the current study were more “open” relative positive
transitions, and mental foci operated likewise to imagery perspectives (experience
focus/first-person imagery; coherence focus/third-person imagery; see discussion on
imagery perspective below), then Crawley’s (2010) findings corroborate the present
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results for perceived personality change, affect, and memory characteristics: A coherence
(vs. experience) focus was associated with greater perceived self-change, lower negative
affect, lower clarity, lower perceptual detail, lower feeling of reliving, and lower physical
reaction during recall. Prospective research, then, could investigate the extent to which
perceived closure informs the current results.
Ancillary Analyses
Imagery perspective. Contrary to what would be predicted by the selfenhancement motive (Sanitioso, 2008), event valence was not associated with imagery
perspective ratings and, inconsistent with the self-coherence motive (McAdams, 1997;
Vinitzky-Seroussi, 1998), perceived self-change as a result of the event did not inform
ratings of imagery perspective. In line with prior work (D’Argembeau et al., 2003),
however, both positive and negative events were reported to contain more first-person, as
compared to third-person, imagery. Noteworthy, though previous research has
demonstrated a close relationship amongst mental focus and imagery perspective
(experience focus/first-person imagery; coherence focus/third-person imagery; e.g.,
Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a), mental focus was not found to influence imagery
perspective ratings in the current study, likely due to methodological differences. For
instance, Libby and Eibach (2011a) provided specific target events (e.g., high-school
graduation) whereas the current study prompted individuals to select a valenced transition
deriving from any point in their personal pasts - a more ecologically valid approach to
studying the potential malleability of meaning for important past events, the salience of
which is necessarily idiosyncratic (Brown & Lee, 2010). Imposing further restrictions on
the sampling of events, therefore, runs counter to the aims of this research. Indeed, the
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lack of mental focus effects on imagery perspective in the current study agrees with
earlier work examining appraisals of transitional events (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015).
Also, in line with Kross and Ayduk (2011), both greater use of third-person imagery and
greater self-distancing were associated with lower feelings of re-experiencing, while a
coherence focus resulted in reports of less reliving of the event relative to an experience
focus.
Taken together, these findings, together with Crawley’s (2010) findings regarding
imagery perspective, lend credence to the idea that mental focus operates likewise to
imagery perspective (coherence/third-person; experience/first-person) but not necessarily
in accordance with it, for the reason that there are other potential determinants of imagery
perspective at play (e.g., distance from the present, content, self-consistency; Libby &
Eibach, 2011a).
Regarding the relationship amongst imagery perspective and self-distance, these
constructs have been distinguished from one another on the basis of the direction of
invoked meaning: visual imagery perspective is thought to be more aligned with bottomup meaning-making processes whereas psychological perspective is thought to rely more
so upon top-down meaning-making processes (Libby & Eibach, 2011b). To distinguish
this claim from the same distinction made amongst visual imagery perspectives (firstperson vs. third-person, respectively; Libby & Eibach, 2011b), it is conceivable that a
self-distanced (vs. self-immersed) perspective entails the shifting of oneself as a bound
psychological entity, complete with reflection, feeling, and general self-knowledge away
from the experience of the event (rather than into it), whereas imagery perspective solely
entails the shifting of visual mental imagery, which may or may not involve self-removal.
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That is, the parsing of the Jamesian “I” and “Me” (James, 1890/1950) may be more
explicit for self-distancing manipulations (e.g., “see the experience unfold through your
own eyes as if it were happening to you again…understand the feelings you felt”; Kross
et al., 2012, p. 569) relative to imagery perspective manipulations (e.g., “see the event
from the same visual perspective as you originally did”; Libby et al., 2005, p. 55), the
function of which is more implicit.
Despite these hypothesized differences, the strong relationship between imagery
perspective and perceived self-distance when recalling events (first-person/selfimmersion; third-person/self-distance) found in the present study is notable, for it serves
to bridge the gap between two parallel but distinct lines of research: one primarily
concerned with the social implications of visual imagery perspective (Libby & Eibach,
2011a; 2011b) and the other primarily concerned with the clinical implications of selfdistancing (Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Crossing these literatures then, may inform the
realms within which they may be applied, their potential differential usefulness (based on
implicit versus explicit functions), and importantly, the mechanisms by which they
operate.
Additional Considerations and Suggestions for Future Work
There are a few additional methodological considerations to address, if not to
further situate the present findings, then to inspire future research. To begin, while the
preservation of ecological validity was provided as a rationale for the current event cues,
it is important to address potential confounds in using this approach. For instance, the
relative ease of access to concrete versus abstract event elements has been suggested to
depend, in part, on the age of the memory (i.e., when the event occurred; Bartlett, 1932;
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Trope & Liberman, 2010; Wyer & Srull, 1986) and its valence (e.g., events characterized
by pride vs. shame; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008), with objectively closer and
positive memories being afforded more detail. In the current study, while there were no
effects of valence on vividness, clarity, or perceptual details, negative events were dated
to have occurred in the more distal past, were considered more difficult to picture, more
complex, and felt like they lasted longer than positive events (this last point agrees with
recent work showing that descriptions of negative experiences tend to include a sense that
time has slowed down; Bluck, 2015). We might also consider the extent to which selected
events are episodic (i.e., occurred on a specific day at a particular time and place in one’s
past). Though many studies employed this instruction, the current study along with
Boucher and Scoboria (2015), found that events generally occurred over the course of
many days to one month. Future research, therefore, may consider potential constraints
on the utility of different mental foci in terms of the range of, and fluent access to,
available details in memory. To limit these potential effects, while not neglecting the
objectives of this research, subsequent work could request events within a specified time
frame (e.g., within the past year).
Further, prior work has shown that memories tend to become more positive as
people age (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004), which bears to mind the usefulness
of longitudinal or cross-sectional research designs in assessing potential differences in the
effectiveness of mental focus manipulations for valenced events. This also prompts
questions about how the valence of the events when they occurred differs from their
valence at retrieval (e.g., an event may have been experienced as negative at the time but
is now regarded as a positive turning point). Though in the current study, participants
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were prompted to select events based on present attributions of valence (i.e., based on
appraisals of favourable vs. unfavourable event outcomes), it is worth acknowledging that
a coherence focus arguably taps such attributions to a greater extent relative to an
experience focus, which is necessarily tied to valence attributions at the time the event is
thought to have occurred. Parsing apart how valence attributions evolve over time and
how such shifts can inform mental focus effects on associated affect constitutes a fruitful
area for future work.
Moreover, the finding that individual’s subjective sense of when events occurred
did not vary as a function of event valence irrespective of their objective temporal
distance from the present disagrees with Temporal Self-Appraisal Theory, which
suggests that positive events should be felt to have occurred closer to the present in order
to preserve an enhanced view of the current self (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross,
2001). Indeed, that individuals’ subjective sense of an event’s distance from the present
did not differ according to event valence while objective distanced did, suggests that
negative events were, in a sense, being subjectively ‘pulled’ closer to the present, perhaps
for reasons relating to the apparent priority status they are afforded for cognitive and
emotional reconciliation. Further delineating conditions in which appraisals of subjective
temporal distance may not necessarily serve to enhance the present self, at least not in the
way Temporal Self-Appraisal Theory predicts, would be an interesting research
endeavour.
Finally, analyses of transition types in the current study suggest two interesting
points. First, that it was possible for a single transition to carry different subjective
valence attributions (e.g., entering university could have been construed as positive for
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some and negative for others), speaks to the fallibility of relying on examiner evaluations
of valence based on event types. It is worth stressing that the current research was not
concerned with ‘objectively’ valenced (i.e., valenced by examiner standards, informed by
generally agreed upon axioms of experience), nor was it concerned with memory
accuracy; rather, it was individuals’ personal appraisals of events, which may or may not
reflect reality or ‘objective’ estimates of valence. Secondly, individuals were noted to
identify transitions that they experienced either directly or indirectly (e.g., own divorce
vs. parents’ divorce), which suggests that although self-defining memories are, by
definition, intrapersonal, they are also interpersonal in nature (Singer & Salovey, 1993);
this accords with self and social functions of autobiographical memory (Bluck, Alea,
Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). This is to say that the way individuals go about reconciling
past transitional events involving others may not only inform their relationship to that
event (i.e., in terms of meaning and emotion), but also their conceptions of, and
interactions with, those relevant others - yet another stimulating focus for subsequent
research.
CONCLUSION
People’s self-concepts are grounded in personally important autobiographical
memories (Conway, 2001, 2005) and their ability to regulate memory-induced emotions
is intricately tied to the construction of meaning (Cox & McAdams, 2014; Kross &
Ayduk, 2011), which ultimately informs psychological functioning (e.g., Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McAdams, 2001). Though individuals may be driven to maintain
an enhanced and coherent view of the self during recall, they may not possess knowledge
of how or when to appropriately apply particular cognitive “tools” already present within
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their repertoire of strategies for autobiographical event representation. The current study
reveals that a coherence (vs. experience) focus can induce appraisals of greater
psychological impact and personality change as a result of an event along with less
negative affect, but only if the event is characterized by self-decline (i.e., the relevant
self-theory). When the event is characterized by self-improvement, a coherence focus
becomes less necessary or wholly irrelevant. It appears, then, that negative events and
associated negative affect are subject to increased cognitive management and are thus
more receptive to available cognitive strategies (i.e., mental focus) relative to the positive
affect that accompanies positive events. For negative transitional experiences, a
coherence (vs. experience) focus then is thought to provide the cognitive means with
which individuals can psychologically separate from the experiential self contained in the
memory while integrating the discrepant event within an overarching conceptual selfview, thereby producing lower ratings of negative affect.
It will be important for future work to identify additional self-theories, and
combinations thereof, that serve to qualify mental focus effects on present affect and
attributions of event meaning, and to further define the limits within which mental focus
may exert effects. By investigating the relative malleability of meaning attributions and
present affect during the recall of positive and negative transitions, this study elucidates
one such framework, suggests the simultaneous operation of self-enhancement and selfcoherence motives, supports the integration of different models concerning affect, draws
a connection amongst parallel but distinct lines of research (i.e., imagery perspective and
self-distance literatures), and points to important factors to consider in clinical research
and practice.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Event Cue Instructions

Positive Transition
Please identify a personally important positive past transition. A positive transition is an
event that has produced some form of positive or favourable change in you and your life.
The transitional event can come from any point in your past. It can deal with something
that happened recently or something that happened many years ago, however, it must be
an event that you were involved in or witnessed firsthand and one that occurred at a
particular time and place.
Once you have identified your positive transitional event, please indicate what it is here:
Negative Transition
Please identify a personally important negative past transition. A negative transition is an
event that has produced some form of negative or unfavourable change in you and your
life.
The transitional event can come from any point in your past. It can deal with something
that happened recently or something that happened many years ago, however, it must be
an event that you were involved in or witnessed firsthand and one that occurred at a
particular time and place.
Once you have identified your negative transitional event, please indicate what it is here:
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Appendix B
Reference Point for Evoked Emotion (adapted from Libby & Eibach, 2011a, 2011b)

Your emotional reaction may derive mostly from thinking about what it was like to
experience the event directly, as if you are actually there, OR your emotional reaction
may derive mostly from thinking about the broader consequences or implications of the
event to you and your life. Please select the one option that best captures the origin of
your emotions:
My emotions mostly result from thinking about what it was like to experience the
event.
My emotions mostly result from thinking about the broader consequences/
implications of the event.
Using the scale below, please indicate the degree to which your emotions result from the
thoughts you indicated (1 = a little, 3 = some, 5 = a lot).
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Appendix C
The Self Assessment Mannequin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994)

Arousal

Valence

On each row below, place the slider under one figure or between two figures that
accurately portray how you are feeling today.
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Appendix D
Mental Focus Manipulation Instructions (adapted from Libby & Eibach, 2011a)

(Screen 1) Approximately 2 weeks ago, you identified a personally important
(negative/positive) event. The event you identified is as follows: (participant will be
presented with the cue word he/she provided at Time 1 and asked to confirm that it is
correct). Consider the event you have identified. When answering the following
questions, please regard this same event.
Experience Manipulation Instructions
(Screen 2) Now focus on the concrete details of your event. That is, think
about what it was like to experience the event directly as if you are actually there
again. For example, where did this event take place? What specific actions (e.g.,
drove, walked, sat, etc.) did you engage in? What did you see? What did you
hear? What did you smell? What objects and what people were involved?
At this time, we are NOT interested in what the event means to you and
we are NOT interested in the larger significance of the event. We are ONLY
interested in the concrete details of what your event entailed, so please try to be
as concrete as you can in describing the actual, specific details of the event you
are recalling. Please use the next 5 to 7 minutes to describe the concrete details
of your event below.
Coherence Manipulation Instructions
(Screen 2) Now focus on the broader significance of your event. For
example, how does this event relate to your previous experiences,
accomplishments, and personal relationships? How does this event relate to your
future? What are the implications of this event? What is the meaning of this
event in terms of your life as a whole and yourself as a person?
At this time, we are NOT interested in the details of the specific actions
that you engaged in and we are NOT interested in the concrete details of what
the event entailed. We are ONLY interested in the broad meaning of your event
for yourself and your life, so please focus on the larger meaning of the event you
are recalling. Please use the next 5 to 7 minutes to describe the broader
significance of your event below.
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Appendix E
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988)

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent [the ‘Moment’ time instruction will be inserted here]. Use the
scale to record your answers.
1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

___interested
___distressed
___excited
___upset
___strong
___guilty
___scared
___hostile
___enthusiastic
___proud

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

___irritable
___alert
___ashamed
___inspired
___nervous
___determined
___attentive
___jittery
___active
___afraid

The following time instructions have been used with the PANAS:
Moment
Today
Past few days
Week
Past few weeks
Year
General

You feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.
You have felt this way today.
You have felt this way during the past few days.
You have felt this way during the past week.
You have felt this way during the past few weeks.
You have felt this way during the past year.
You generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average.
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Appendix F
Transitional Impact Scale (TIS-12; Svob, Brown, Reddon, Uzer, & Lee, 2013)

Carefully consider the event you have described. In assessing your life after the
event, rate the degree to which the following statements were true of your
experience. The scale ranges from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely
agree). If your experience falls somewhere in between complete disagreement
and agreement, please indicate this by choosing a value between 1 and 5 that
most closely reflected your experience.
(Material Subscale)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

This event has changed the places where I hang out.
This event has changed the things I own.
This event has changed my material circumstances.
This event has changed the activities I engage in.
This event has changed the people I spend time with.
This event has changed where I live.

(Psychological Subscale)
7. This event has changed my attitudes.
8. This event has changed the way I think about things.
9. This event has impacted my emotional responses.
10. This event has changed my sense of self.
11. This event has impacted me psychologically.
12. This event has influenced my understanding of right and wrong.
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Appendix G
The Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006)

Answer the following questions in an honest and sincere way, by selecting a number
from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree).
1. I feel this event has become part of my identity.
2. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.
3. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the
world.
4. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.
5. This event permanently changed my life.
6. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.
7. This event was a turning point in my life.
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Appendix H
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski et al., 2001)

Everyone gets confronted with negative or unpleasant events now and then and everyone
responds to them in their own way. By the following questions, you are asked to indicate
what you generally think when you experience negative or unpleasant events, by
selecting a number from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always).
Self-Blame Subscale (survey numbers 1, 10, 19, 28):
1. I feel that I am the one to blame for it
2. I feel that I am the one who is responsible for what has happened
3. I think about the mistakes I have made in this matter
4. I think that basically the cause must lie within myself
Acceptance Subscale (survey numbers 2, 11, 20, 29):
5. I think that I have to accept that this has happened
6. I think that I have to accept the situation
7. I think that I cannot change anything about it
8. I think that I must learn to live with it
Focus on Thought/Rumination Subscale (survey numbers 3, 12, 21, 30):
9. I often think about how I feel about what I have experienced
10. I am preoccupied with what I think and feel about what I have experienced
11. I want to understand why I feel the way I do about what I have experienced
12. I dwell upon the feelings the situation has evoked in me
Positive Refocusing Subscale (survey numbers 4, 13, 22, 31):
13. I think of nicer things than what I have experienced
14. I think of pleasant things that have nothing to do with it
15. I think of something nice instead of what has happened
16. I think about pleasant experiences
Refocus on Planning Subscale (survey numbers 5, 14, 23, 32):
17. I think of what I can do best
18. I think about how I can best cope with the situation
19. I think about how to change the situation
20. I think about a plan of what I can do best
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Positive Reappraisal Subscale (survey numbers 6, 15, 24, 33):
21. I think I can learn something from the situation
22. I think that I can become a stronger person as a result of what has happened
23. I think that the situation also has its positive sides
24. I look for the positive side to the matter
Putting into Perspective Subscale (survey numbers 7, 16, 25, 34):
25. I think that it all could have been much worse
26. I think that other people go through much worse experiences
27. I think that it hasn’t been too bad compared to other things
28. I tell myself that there are worse things in life
Catastrophizing Subscale (survey numbers 8, 17, 26, 35):
29. I often think that what I have experienced is much worse than what others have
experienced
30. I keep thinking about how terrible it is what I have experienced
31. I often think that what I have experienced is the worst that can happen to a person
32. I continually think how horrible the situation has been
Blaming Others Subscale (survey numbers 9, 18, 27, 36):
33. I feel that others are to blame for it
34. I feel that others are responsible for what has happened
35. I think about the mistakes others have made in this matter
36. I feel that basically the cause lies with others
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Appendix I
Other Memory Characteristics

Imagery perspective, subjective temporal distance, and difficulty picturing items are
adapted from Libby and Eibach (2011a):
(Imagery Perspective) Some images you may see from the first-person
perspective, which means you see the event from the same visual perspective that
you originally did. In other words, in your mind you are looking out at your
surroundings through your own eyes.
Some images you may see from the third-person perspective, which means you
see the event from an observer’s visual perspective. In other words, in your mind
you can actually see yourself, as well as your surroundings.
Indicate the relative proportion of images experienced from each perspective
while describing your event previously. (1 = All first-person images [from my
own eyes]; 8 = All third-person images [from an observer’s eyes]).
(Subjective Temporal Distance) Regardless of when events actually occurred in
the past, sometimes they feel very far away, while other times they feel very close
almost like yesterday. As you think about it right now, how far away does the
event you recalled FEEL to you? (0 = Like yesterday; 10 = The very distant past).
(Difficulty Picturing) How difficult was it for you to picture this event? (1 = Not
at all difficult; 7 = Very difficult).
An index of objective temporal distance will be calculated using the participant’s present
age and estimated age at the time of the event (adapted from Berntsen & Bohn, 2010):
(Age at Event) How old were you when your transitional event took place?
(Estimate age in years).
(Days Ago) If you indicated your current age in the previous question, how many
days from today is the event in the past? (Estimate time in days).
(Current Age) What is your current age?
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Items assessing recollective aspects of memories are adapted from Berntsen and Bohn
(2010), Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988), Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg
(2003):
(Emotional Valence) The emotions I have when I recall the episode are (-3 =
Extremely negative; 3 = Extremely positive).
(Emotional Intensity) As I am thinking about this event now, my feelings are (1 =
Not intense; 7 = Very intense).
(Vividness) When describing this event, it was vivid in my mind (1 = Not at all; 7
= To a very high degree).
(Perceptual Detail) When I thought of this event, I could see and hear in my mind
what took place (1 = Not at all; 7 = To a very high degree).
(Re-Experience) When recalling this event, it was as if I was re-experiencing it (1
= Not at all; 7 = To a very high degree).
(Feeling of Reliving) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving the
original event (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much).
(Mental Time Travel) As I thought about this event, I felt that I traveled back to
the time when it happened, that I was a subject in it, rather than an outside
observer tied to the present (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much).
(Clarity of Location) When I think about this event, the location where the event
takes place is (1= Vague; 7 = Clear/distinct).
(Clarity of Objects) When I think about this event, the relative spatial
arrangement of objects is (1 = Vague; 7 = Clear/distinct).
(Clarity of People) When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement
of people in my memory is (1 = Vague; 7 = Clear/distinct).
(Narrative Coherence) As I thought about this event, it came to me in words or in
pictures as a coherent story or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts, or
thoughts (1 = Not at all; 7 = Coherent story).
(Thought/Talked) Since it happened, I have thought and talked a lot about this
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episode (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very often).
(Reaction) I had a physical/bodily reaction to the memory – for example, by
talking to myself, smiling, crying, shivering, palpitation, laughing, etc. (1 = Not at
all; 7 = To a very high degree).
(Emotional Re-experience) As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions
that I felt then (1 = Not at all; 7 = As clearly as if it were happening right now).
(Importance) This event is important to my life (1 – Not at all; 7 = To a very high
degree).
(Connectedness) As I think about this event, it is connected with other events (1 =
Not at all; 7 = Very much).
An item assessing the extent of experiential self-immersion versus distancing is derived
from Ayduk and Kross (2010):
(Self-Distance/Immersion) As you ponder your thoughts and feelings about your
experience, indicate the extent to which you adopt an immersed perspective and
see your event replay through your own eyes versus a distanced perspective and
see the event unfold as an observer: (1 = Predominantly my own eyes [immersed
perspective], 7 = Predominantly the eyes of an observer [distanced perspective]).
Items assessing event duration and serving a response consistency checks are derived
from Boucher and Scoboria (2015):
(Objective Event Duration) How long did your remembered event last?
On one specific day.
Over the course of many days.
Over the course of one month.
Over the course of many months and longer.
(TIS-Material Check) The way I lived, carried out activities and engaged with
others before this event is ________ compared to after this event (1 = Almost
entirely the same; 5 = Almost entirely different).
(TIS-Psychological Check) The way I thought or felt about myself and how I
understood the world before this event is ________ compared to my life after this
event (1 = Almost entirely the same; 5 = Almost entirely different).
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Appendix J
Behavioural Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985)

Any behavior can be identified in many ways. For example, one person might describe a
behavior as "typing a paper," while another might describe the behavior as "pushing
keys." Yet another person might describe the behavior as "expressing thoughts." We are
interested in your personal preferences for how a number of different behaviors should be
described. On the following pages you will find several different behaviors listed. After
each behavior will be two choices of different ways in which the behavior might be
identified. Here is an example:
1. Attending class
— a. sitting in a chair
— b. looking at the blackboard
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behavior for
you. Simply select one identification statement for each pair. Of course, there are no right
or wrong answers. People differ in their preferences for the different behavior
descriptions, and we are interested in your personal preferences. Be sure to select your
choice for each behavior. Remember, choose the description that you personally
believe is more appropriate in each pair.
1. Making a list
a. Getting organizeda
b. Writing things down

5. Picking an apple
a. Getting something to eata
b. Pulling an apple off a branch

2. Reading
a. Following lines of print
b. Gaining knowledgea

6. Chopping down a tree
a. Wielding an axe
b. Getting firewooda

3. Joining the Army
a. Helping the Nation's defensea
b. Signing up

7. Measuring a room for carpeting
a. Getting ready to remodela
b. Using a yard stick

4. Washing clothes
a. Removing odors from clothesa
b. Putting clothes into the machine

8. Cleaning the house
a. Showing one's cleanlinessa
b. Vacuuming the floor
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9. Painting a room
a. Applying brush strokes
b. Making the room look fresha

18. Greeting someone
a. Saying hello
b. Showing friendlinessa

10. Paying the rent
a. Maintaining a place to livea
b. Writing a check

19. Resisting temptation
a. Saying "no"
b. Showing moral couragea

11. Caring for houseplants
a. Watering plants
b. Making the room look nicea

20. Eating
a. Getting nutritiona
b. Chewing and swallowing

12. Locking a door
a. Putting a key in the lock
b. Securing the housea

21. Growing a garden
a. Planting seeds
b. Getting fresh vegetablesa

13. Voting
a. Influencing the electiona
b. Marking a ballot

22. Traveling by car
a. Following a map
b. Seeing countrysidea

14. Climbing a tree
a. Getting a good viewa
b. Holding on to branches

23. Having a cavity filled
a. Protecting your teetha
b. Going to the dentist

15. Filling out a personality test
a. Answering questions
b. Revealing what you're likea

24. Talking to a child
a. Teaching a child somethinga
b. Using simple words

16. Toothbrushing
a. Preventing tooth decaya
b. Moving a brush around in one's mouth

25. Pushing a doorbell
a. Moving a finger
b. Seeing if someone's homea

17. Taking a test
a. Answering questions
b. Showing one's knowledgea
Note. a represents the abstract response option.
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Appendix K
Manipulation Check Items

Both event valence and mental focus manipulation check items are derived from Libby
and Eibach (2011a) and read as follows:
(Personality Change) As a result of this event I have changed as a person (1 = Not
at all. I am the same now as I was before this event; 8 = Completely. I am
completely different now than I was before this event).
(Personality Change Valence) If you have indicated that you have changed as a
result of this event, how have you changed? (1 = Entirely for the worse; 8 =
Entirely for the better).
(Mental Focus Check) When describing your event earlier, you may have focused
more on what is was like to experience the event directly, for example, by
describing the sights, sounds, and smells you experienced and/or your thoughts
and feelings during the event.
OR, you may have focused more on analyzing the meaning of the event in your
life, for example, by explaining the broader significance of the event, what it says
about your personality and/or goals, how it connects to other events in your life,
and/or what the consequences were or are. Please indicate the focus of your
thoughts using the scale below: (1 = Focused completely on what it was like to
experience the event, not at all on analyzing the event; 8 = Focused completely on
analyzing the event, not at all on what it was like to experience the event).
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Appendix L
Questions Regarding Demographics

(Current Age) What is your current age? _________
(Gender) What is your gender?
Female
Male
Other (please specify): _________
(Ethnic Background) What is your ethnic background?
Black or African
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian
Native
Hispanic or Latino
Multiracial
Decline to respond
Other (please specify): _________
(Academic major) What is your academic major? _________
(Academic year) What is your current academic year?
First year
Second year
Third year
Fourth year
Other (please specify): _________
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Appendix M
Open-Ended Questions Following Participation in the Study

(Unstructured Event Description) Earlier, you were asked to describe some aspects of
your transitional event. If you wish to provide additional information, perhaps about what
it was like to experience your event and/or what your event means to you and your life,
you may take some time to write about it here.
(Feedback about the Study) If you wish to leave any comments, questions, or concerns
about your experience as a participant in this study, please feel free to do so here. Your
feedback is greatly appreciated.
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